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Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United 
States? 
Michael S. Mireles* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a substantial amount of literature concerning 
evidence of so-called “patent trolls” or “patent assertion entities” 
and “non-practicing entities.”1 There are also reports about 
“copyright trolls.”2 However, there is much less literature and 
reporting on “trademark trolls” in the United States. This Paper 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. The author is 
thankful for the research assistance of Kelsey Lim, Paolo Visante, and Gina Guiterrez, 
and the comments of Professor Megan La Belle, Professor Gary Pulsinelli, Professor Mary 
Lee Ryan, Professor Tom Bell, Brad Greenberg, Lindy Herman, and Chris Arledge. The 
author is grateful for the research assistance and hospitality of the Chapman Law Review 
editorial staff for the 2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium “Trolls or Toll-Takers: Do 
Intellectual Property Non-practicing Entities Add Value to Society?” including Rachel 
Baker, Madiha Shahabuddin, and Janelle Wilke. 
 1 See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006); 
Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of 
Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307 (2006); Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1809 (2007); John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, 
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech 
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2009) (noting that in an eight-year period, 
“[c]ounting suits based on the number of defendants and including [declaratory judgment] 
cases,” non-practicing entities were involved in “28% of all high-tech patent suits”); Sarah 
Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357 (2012); Robin 
Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sarah Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent 
Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013); Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson 
Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio and Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 773 (2014); Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking 
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014).  
 2 See, e.g., James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of 
Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79 
(2012); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 723 (2013); Gregory S. Mortenson, BitTorrent Copyright Trolling: A Pragmatic 
Proposal for a Systemic Problem, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1105 (2013); Brad A. Greenberg, 
Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2014); Jack 
Vidovich, Comment, I Want to Be a Non-producer: Copyright Non-practicing Entities and 
the Group Registration Process for Photographs, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 679 (2014). 
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explains why trademark trolls are not and may not develop as a 
problem in the United States.3  
Initially this Paper discusses patent trolls and separates 
“trolling behavior” from other troubling trademark enforcement 
practices such as “bullying.”4 This Paper then gives the reasons 
why trademark trolls are likely not a problem in the United 
States. First, the primary defining characteristic of a troll is a 
failure to practice the intellectual property. Because of the 
common and federal law requirement of “use” in trademark law 
in the United States, it is highly unlikely an entity asserting a 
trademark is not also using the trademark.5 Additionally, 
trademark trolling is unlikely to occur because of the 
requirement that a trademark must not be assigned “in gross” 
and trademark licensing must not be “naked.”6 The trademark 
must be assigned with the corresponding goodwill associated 
with the mark and the trademark must be licensed with some 
quality control exercised by the licensor.7 This presupposes that 
there is some continued use of the trademark. Second, in 
circumstances where trademark trolling could occur, such as 
with Internet domain names, Congress and the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) have 
reacted relatively quickly with laws and policies, respectively, 
that make trademark trolling unlikely to occur.8 For example, 
Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (ACPA) and ICANN utilizes its dispute resolution process to 
address potential trolls.9 Moreover, the lessons learned from 
trademarks and Internet domain names have allowed ICANN to 
preempt potential trolling issues that may have arisen from the 
registration of new top-level domains. Foresight, experience, and 
good planning will likely mitigate the impact of potential trolls. 
Third, U.S. trademark law utilizes meaningful inter partes 
proceedings, such as opposition and cancellation proceedings, at 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to 
address applied-for marks which may potentially infringe 
 
 3 Because the law is evolving, a trademark troll problem may develop in the future. 
For example, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana 
Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907 (2015), arguably approves a generous tacking standard. Moreover, 
the erosion of the use requirement and the prohibitions on naked licensing and 
assignments in gross could lead to the development of a trademark troll problem. 
 4 See infra Part Trademark Enforcement Issues and the Reasons There Is Not a 
Trademark Troll Problem.  
 5 See infra Part B.1.  
 6 See infra Part B.1.c.  
 7 See id.  
 8 See infra Part B.2.  
 9 See infra Part B.2.a.  
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pre-existing marks.10 Through the publication of the Official 
Gazette, mark owners are put on notice of potentially infringing 
marks which get too close to their marks and which may 
foreclose their expansion into new lines of business.11 These 
proceedings also provide an opportunity to challenge applied-for 
marks that originated in intent-to-use applications.12  
Fourth, trademark law may benefit from the applicability of 
law developed to address patent trolls.13 For example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s eBay v. MercExchange decision concerning 
patent injunctions has been applied to trademark injunctions, 
thus removing a presumption of irreparable harm where a 
likelihood of success on the merits is demonstrated.14 The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness 
decision concerning attorney fees in patent cases has also been 
applied in trademark cases.15 Fifth, the litigation and other 
strategic advantages present in so-called patent trolling cases 
may not be available in trademark cases.16 Sixth, state attorney 
general enforcement of state consumer protection laws against 
patent trolls may deter a trademark troll problem from 
developing.17 Notably, at least one state has already considered 
legislation specifically targeted at trademark trolls.18 Moreover, 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) enforcement of 
federal consumer protection laws against patent trolls may 
similarly deter trademark trolls.19 Seventh, one commentator has 
argued that the patent troll problem developed, in part, because 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (Federal 
Circuit) nationwide exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases.20 Trademark law is less susceptible to a troll problem 
developing because the various federal circuit courts of appeals, 
as well as state courts, have jurisdiction to hear trademark 
appeals.21 Finally, an early U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit decision addressing trademark trolling upheld an award 
of attorney fees against a troll and canceled the troll’s mark for 
 
 10 See infra Part B.3.  
 11 See infra Part B.3.a.  
 12 See infra Part B.3.  
 13 See infra Part B.4.  
 14 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 15 Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).  
 16 See infra Part B.5.  
 17 See infra Part B.6.  
 18 See id.  
 19 See id.  
 20 See infra note 284.  
 21 See infra Part B.7.  
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lack of use.22 This case has perhaps provided a disincentive to 
trademark trolling.23  
TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT ISSUES AND THE REASONS THERE IS 
NOT A TRADEMARK TROLL PROBLEM 
This section discusses enforcement issues concerning patents 
and trademarks, and the reasons why there is not a trademark 
troll problem. The first part of the section examines the patent 
troll, trademark bully, and trademark troll question. The second 
part explains why a trademark troll problem is unlikely to 
develop.  
A.  An Overview of the Patent Troll, Trademark Bully, and 
Trademark Troll Problem 
This section explains the patent troll and trademark bully 
problem. It also explains why trademark-bullying conduct should 
be separated from an analysis of the trademark troll problem.  
1. Patent Trolls 
There is a substantial amount of discussion in the literature 
concerning the definition of a so-called patent troll.24 Sometimes 
 
 22 See infra Part B.8.  
 23 See id. For an extensive discussion of that case along with an analysis of the use 
requirement and the district court’s ability to cancel marks, see Anna B. Folgers, Note, 
The Seventh Circuit’s Approach to Deterring the Trademark Troll: Say Goodbye to Your 
Registration and Pay the Costs of Litigation, 3 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 452 (2007), 
available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v3-1/folgers.pdf. 
 24 See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy 
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 164 (2006) 
(“Despite the difficulty of defining exactly what a patent troll is, it appears clear from 
contemporary definitions that a patent troll is an entity that neither develops novel 
technologies nor uses those technologies to provide goods or services to the market. 
Rather, a patent troll acquires patents for the sole purpose of using them to obtain a 
revenue stream from a firm that engages in activities arguably falling within the scope of 
the patent.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“Defining a patent troll has proven a tricky business, 
but that does not mean the problem does not exist. Nonpracticing entities file 30–40% of 
all patent suits in the computing and electronics industries . . . .”); Lemley, supra note 1, 
at 612 (“[A] troll is as a troll does. Universities will sometimes be bad actors. So will 
non-manufacturing patent owners. So will manufacturing patent owners.”); Miranda 
Jones, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: 
How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Rights of Non-practicing Entities, 14 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2007) (discussing the defining of “patent trolls,” including 
“[r]eformulations of the definition . . . [such as] . . . an enforcing entity’s lack of active 
competition with the infringer, collection of nuisance-value settlements, threat of 
litigation on dubious patents, and usage of the patents as a means to generate revenue”); 
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top: The 
Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2009) (“Of the 
twelve entity classes, only one (Class 8) involves enforcement by a patent owner that 
actually makes products. The remainder are different types of ‘nonpracticing entities,’ 
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patent trolls are referred to as patent assertion entities or 
non-practicing entities.25 The troll is essentially a monster who 
lives under a bridge and extracts a fee from anyone who attempts 
to cross the bridge.26 Importantly, the troll did not build the 
bridge—or invest its labor in building the bridge. Similarly, a 
patent troll is often an entity that did not develop a patented 
technology, but is considered the owner of that patent with 
standing to enforce it.27 Notably, the defining characteristic of the 
patent troll is that it does not “practice” the patented invention.28 
The patent troll merely taxes others who practice the invention.29 
Thus, the entities that actually provide access or use of the 
invention to the public are “held up” by the troll and must license 
or stop using the patented invention.30  
 
sometimes called ‘patent trolls’ for the prototypical practice of hiding under a bridge they 
did not build and demanding a toll from surprised passersby.”).  
 25 Commentators have attempted to make distinctions between all three categories. 
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
EcoSystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 326–32 
(2010) (discussing distinctions between non-practicing entities that are “research and 
development entities,” “patent-assertion entities,” “Defensive Patenting Funds,” and 
“Startups”); Xun (Michael) Liu, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-practicing Entity 
Patent Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
489, 491 (2013) (“There is a subset of NPEs [who do not practice an invention], sometimes 
called patent assertion entities, which use patent licenses and damage awards as their 
only revenue source. These entities are also referred to as ‘patent trolls’ because they 
characteristically hold patents until a related product becomes profitable, then emerge to 
demand payments from unsuspecting companies, much like the trolls of folklore that 
ambush unsuspecting passersby.”). But see Jones, supra note 24, at 1041–42 (abandoning 
use of the term “patent troll” in favor of NPE, who “is a patent owner that does not 
practice the patented invention and, rather than abandoning the right to exclude, seeks to 
enforce the patent right through the negotiation of licenses against those who infringe on 
the patent”).  
 26 The affixation of the label “patent troll” to entities engaged in certain conduct is 
credited to Peter Detkin, Anne Gundlefinger, or Mark Davis. See Joff Wild, The Real 
Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, IAM BLOG (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=cff2afd3-c24e-42e5-aa68-a4b4e7524177.  
 27 See also Magliocca, supra note 1, at 1814 (“In essence, trolls bring infringement 
suits based on a patent that was not enforced previously but is being used by others as if 
the know-how is in the public domain. The ensuing litigation comes as a surprise to a 
defendant, which is why these suits are analogized to mythical trolls that hid under 
bridges and leapt out to demand a ransom from travelers.”).  
 28 See Liu, supra note 25, at 491 (“In general, the term [non-practicing entity] refers 
to any patent-holding individual or organization that does not practice the invention, but 
instead licenses or asserts its patents to generate revenue.”); Jones, supra note 24, at 
1041–42 (“An NPE is a patent owner that does not practice the patented invention . . . .”); 
Rantanen, supra note 24, at 165 (“Typically, to be a patent troll a firm must have no 
intent to actually practice the patent.”).  
 29 See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 690 (2012) (“While there is no clear definition, most people use 
the term [patent troll] to refer to [non-practicing entities] that acquire patents only to 
license or enforce them against companies using the invention. The entity is 
‘nonpracticing’ because it does not manufacture products or otherwise make use of the 
invention.”).  
 30 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 24, at 2008 (“The potential for an injunction 
against a whole product can and does permit so-called patent trolls to hold up defendants 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
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Patent trolls inflict other related harms as well. Some of 
those harms include impeding innovation by forcing parties 
practicing patented inventions to stop using those inventions to 
innovate and driving up the costs of products and services 
utilizing patented inventions.31 The most troubling example of a 
patent troll is one that threatens alleged infringers based on 
poor-quality patents.32 Thus, there is very little justification for 
allowing that behavior because there are no corresponding 
benefits provided by that troll. Poor-quality patents exist, in part, 
because the USPTO may not have access to relevant prior art to 
determine whether an invention is new or nonobvious.33 
Moreover, some argue that the Federal Circuit is partly 
responsible for the patent troll problem.34 The argument is that 
the troll problem exists because the Federal Circuit is essentially 
pro-patent.35 Examples of Federal Circuit pro-patent case law 
include expanding patent-eligible subject matter and restricting 
 
by threatening to enjoin products that are predominantly noninfringing. As we have just 
shown, this threat can easily enable a patent holder to negotiate a settlement for an 
amount of money significantly exceeding the amount that the patent holder could expect 
to earn in damages based on reasonable royalties.”).  
 31 See Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to 
Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 377 (2005) (“One expert concluded that 
the patent troll problem amounted to a hidden tax on technology products, hampering 
innovation and preventing a large number of products from entering the market . . . .”).  
 32 Professor Magliocca explains the problem well:  
Low quality patents contribute to trolls in two ways. First, if a patent is 
erroneously granted on something already in the public domain (e.g., the 
wheel) then the effective dormancy period will be exceptionally long. This in 
turn means that the sunk costs of other users will be high when the troll brings 
its case. Second, if examiners let especially vague patents issue then the 
uncertainty surrounding what is protected will make it easier for opportunistic 
licensors to wreak havoc. Understanding the scope of an ordinary patent is 
hard enough. A defendant in an infringement suit based on an unclear patent, 
though, faces even more risk of defeat.  
Magliocca, supra note 1, at 1827; see also James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 
(2008) (discussing vague boundaries of issued patents in some fields); McDonough, supra 
note 1, at 202 (“The first problem frustrating discussion [about patent trolls] is the quality 
of patents being issued by an understaffed U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Bad 
patents are being issued daily.”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 49–52 (2010) (discussing 
poor quality patents).  
 33 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 145 (2004) (discussing problems examiners have in accessing prior art, 
particularly for software and business methods).  
 34 See Eli Dourado, The True Story of How the Patent Bar Captured a Court and 
Shrank the Intellectual Commons, CATO UNBOUND (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.cato-unbou 
nd.org/2014/09/08/eli-dourado/true-story-how-patent-bar-captured-court-shrank-intellectu 
al-commons. 
 35 Id.; JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 33, at 125 (“[L]egal commentators . . . collectively 
agree that the primary direction of the changes [by the Federal Circuit] has been in the 
direction of strengthening patent-holders’ rights.”).  
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
2015] Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States? 821 
the use of the obviousness doctrine.36 Both expansions have 
increased the likelihood that suspect patents may issue from the 
USPTO.37  
A broad definition of a troll may include an entity such as a 
university.38 Unsurprisingly, most universities do not actually 
practice the technology that they patent and may need private 
partners for commercialization.39 However, most would not 
include a university within the definition of a patent troll.40 
Moreover, so-called trolls may provide a benefit to individuals or 
companies that are not in the position to commercially exploit 
their invention by providing a way to monetize that patented 
invention.41 Trolls provide an affordable way for individuals and 
small businesses to enforce their patents.42  
An example of a patent troll is MPHJ Technology 
Investments (MPHJ)43—popularly known in the media as the 
 
 36 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 33, at 115–23 (discussing Federal Circuit changes 
to nonobviouness and patent-eligible subject matter doctrines).  
 37 See id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has subsequently acted to restrain the 
Federal Circuit in a series of cases involving patent-eligible subject matter and in an 
obviousness case. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); KSR 
Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
 38 See Liu, supra note 25, at 491 (“The term [NPE] may describe universities, 
research organizations, or other licensing entities.”).  
 39 Compare McDonough, supra note 1, at 199 (“The universities, funded by the 
government, do not intend to use or practice the inventions they patent. Nor do they 
manufacture goods. Instead, the main goal of university research is to earn revenue by 
licensing the technology.”), with Lemley, supra note 1, at 611 (“University technology 
transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely 
maximizing the university’s licensing revenue.”). This is not true for research tools 
developed and used by universities. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, 
Licensing, Research Tools and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology 
Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 147 (2004) (noting a market exists for those 
tools).  
 40 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 612 (“[Universities] share some characteristics with 
trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but they are not trolls.”); see also Jones, 
supra note 24, at 1042 (distinguishing between NPEs that are “patent generators,” such 
as universities, versus “patent dealers,” “who have no interest in the inventive process, 
but acquire patents for the purpose of enforcing them”).  
 41 See Bryant, supra note 29, at 693–94 (discussing benefits of patent trolls); Ferrill, 
supra note 31, at 378–79; see also Jones, supra note 24, at 1043 (discussing that an NPE 
is beneficial because it: “(1) deters free riders; (2) enforces valid patents; (3) provides a 
market in which inventors may profit; (4) establishes the market value of patents; and (5) 
encourages competition and innovation”); McDonough, supra note 1, at 190 (“Patent trolls 
provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets—the 
same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets.”). While this may be true with 
respect to patents and copyrights, it is not true with respect to trademark matters except 
arguably in cases concerning reverse confusion. Moreover, many of the other asserted 
benefits of patent trolls do not apply in the context of trademarks. Trademark trolls do 
not mitigate consumer confusion or protect goodwill because the trademark troll is not 
using the mark. Thus, there is no opportunity to protect goodwill or prevent confusion 
because there is no mark to connect with the goodwill and no consumers will be confused.  
 42 See Bryant, supra note 29, at 694.  
 43 Debra Cassens Weiss, Threatened Patent Suits Amounted to Deceptive Tactics, 
FTC Alleges; Law Firm and Client Settle, ABA J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:15 AM), 
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“scanner” troll.44 MPHJ apparently does not practice the 
inventions in its patents or any other technology.45 MPHJ has 
sent cease-and-desist letters to thousands of purported 
infringers.46 Notably, MPHJ apparently did not conduct a 
detailed investigation whether there was actually an 
infringement and has not followed through with filing suit.47 The 
letters appear to be an attempt to hold up alleged infringers.48  
Despite the benefits provided by some trolls, patent trolls are 
subject to severe criticism by commentators. For example, 
numerous commentators have made proposals addressing the 
patent troll problem.49 Indeed, there have been numerous 
legislative proposals before Congress directed at the troll issue.50 
The courts have also reacted to the troll problem. The 
U.S. Supreme Court issued the eBay v. MercExchange opinion, 
which addressed patent injunctions and removed the traditional 
presumption of irreparable harm when a likelihood of success is 
demonstrated in a patent infringement case.51 The Federal 
 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/threatened_patent_suits_amounted_to_deceptiv
e_tactics_ftc_alleges_law_firm/.  
 44 See Julie Samuels, MPHJ Exposed: The Real Dirt on the Notorious Scanner Troll, 
TROLLING EFFECTS BLOG (Jan. 14, 2014), https://trollingeffects.org/blog/mphj-exposed-
real-dirt-notorious-scanner-troll.  
 45 See Complaint at 2–3, In the Matter of MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC et al., F.T.C. File 
No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu 
ments/cases/141106mphjcmpt.pdf?utm_source=govdelivery.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. According to the ABA Journal, MPHJ Technology Investments’ egregious 
behavior included the following:  
[T]housands of small business owners received a series of three letters from 
MPHJ subsidiaries and Farney Daniels as part of an effort to sell licenses 
relating to network computer scanning technology. The law firm was to receive 
30 to 40 percent of the money generated as its fee. 
 The first letter from an MPHJ subsidiary told more than 16,000 small 
business owners they were likely infringing patents by using common office 
equipment and they were being contacted to discuss the need for a license, 
according to the administrative complaint. The second letter on Farney Daniels 
letterhead, sent to more than 10,000 businesses, said the lack of a response has 
led its client to “reasonably assume” infringement and the matter has been 
referred to the law firm. The third letter, sent to more than 4,800 businesses, 
says that if the recipient does not respond in two weeks, it will be sued for 
patent infringement. The letter included a draft complaint.  
Weiss, supra note 43.  
 48 For additional examples of patent trolls and how they target small businesses, see 
generally Liu, supra note 25, at 494–500.  
 49 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 50 See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-
patent-reform-legislation/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (describing fourteen bills directed at 
patent reform and trolls); Trevor Nagel & Ruchita Dhawan, Anti-patent Troll 
Legislation: What Is Proposed and What It Could Mean, WHITE & CASE TECH. NEWSFLASH 
(Apr. 2014), http://www.whitecase.com/articles/2014/anti-patent-troll-legislation-what-is-
proposed-and-what-it-could-mean/.  
 51 See eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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Circuit has, through former Chief Judge Rader, publicly 
addressed whether the troll problem should be dealt with 
through legislation or the courts.52 Even the White House has 
made proposals to address patent trolls and innovation.53 The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation has created a website to track the 
activity of patent trolls.54 Notably, there are even reports of 
copyright trolls.55 The copyright troll may be an entity that did 
not create the copyrighted work and does not publish that work, 
but merely exists to extract statutory damages or licensing fees 
from those that make that work available to the public.56 
2. Trademark Enforcement Issues: Trademark Trolls and 
Trademark Bullies 
Despite the reports of patent and copyright trolls, there is—
relatively speaking—much less discussion or reporting 
concerning trademark trolls. Some media reports place the label 
of “troll” on aggressive enforcement of trademarks; however, this 
conduct is more appropriately labeled “bullying” and not 
“trolling.”57 In cases involving trademark bullying, the trademark 
owner is enforcing its trademark against an entity—usually with 
less resources than the trademark owner—with a questionable or 
overreaching claim.58 The questionable claim may be based on a 
 
 52 See Michael S. Mireles, Chief Judge Rader’s Recent Comments on Patents and the 
Federal Circuit Bar Association, IP FIN. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2013), http://ipfinance.blog 
spot.com/2013/11/chief-judge-raders-recent-comments-on.html.  
 53 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High Tech 
Issues (June 4, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/ 
04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues (describing five executive 
actions and seven legislative recommendations to address patent assertion entities).  
 54 See Adi Kamdar & Julie Samuels, Trolling Effects: Taking on Patent Trolls with 
Your Help, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 31, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deep 
links/2013/07/trolling-effects-taking-patent-trolls-your-help.  
 55 The most commonly noted “copyright troll” is Righthaven, which essentially 
purchased the copyright to newspaper articles and proceeded to enforce the copyright 
against many, including nonprofits. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 65–70. Notably, 
“Righthaven filed 276 lawsuits and reportedly recovered $352,500 in 141 settlements.” Id. 
at 67.  
 56 This is a relatively broad definition of a copyright troll. Notably, there are also 
problems with defining a copyright troll. Brad Greenberg provides the following definition 
of a copyright troll:  
[T]his Article defines a copyright troll as a copyright owner who: (1) acquires a 
copyright—either through purchase or act of authorship—for the primary 
purpose of pursuing past, present, or future infringement actions; (2) 
compensates authors or creates works with an eye to the litigation value of a 
work, not the commercial value; (3) lacks a good faith licensing program; and 
(4) uses the prospect of statutory damages and litigation expenses to extract 
quick settlements of often weak claims. 
Id. at 59. 
 57 I am not making the argument that trademark enforcement practices are without 
problems.  
 58 Similarly to patent trolls, there is not a universally accepted definition of 
trademark bullies. See Trevor Little, List of the Top ‘Trademark Bullies’ Renews Debate 
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trademark infringement theory of association, sponsorship, 
initial interest, or reverse confusion, that may involve goods and 
services that are not directly competitive with the alleged 
infringer’s goods and services.59 The claim could also be based 
upon dilution theory. The significant amount of money required 
to defend such a claim along with disputed factual issues, which 
may preclude early resolution of suit, may incentivize alleged 
infringers threatened with a cease-and-desist letter to simply 
stop doing the allegedly infringing activity.60 The particularly 
troublesome incidents of trademark bullying impact areas 
protected by the First Amendment or implicate competition 
concerns.61 Thus, a trademark holder may use a cease-and-desist 
letter based on an underlying weak claim to squash speech or 
competition.62  
There is an argument that trademark doctrine and policy 
itself provides every incentive for trademark owners to vigorously 
enforce their marks for fear of losing the mark to genericide, to 
ensure the mark remains strong, to prevent dilution, and to 
preserve future lines of trade under the mark, among other 
reasons;63 however, this does not necessarily mean that the 
trademark owner is a troll. Those are legitimate reasons and may 
set up an “enforce it” or “lose it” reasoning process justifying 
vigorous enforcement of a mark. Indeed, some trademarks have 
reached valuations in the billions of dollars.64 Moreover, mark 
holders control the scope of protection of their mark through 
 
on Enforcement Strategies, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.world 
trademarkreview.com/daily/detail.aspx?g=8fc00cc3-ebe7-466f-a124-89d93d84f031. For a 
helpful definition of a trademark bully, see Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark 
Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 642–50 (2011).  
 59 Notably, the subject matter of what can be a trademark has expanded. See Jerome 
Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and Cherry-Scented 
Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 774 
(2005) (discussing expansive nature of trademark subject matter). However, the 
connection between expanded trademark subject matter per se and increased enforcement 
of those marks is less clear than with patents. For example, patent-eligible subject matter 
was arguably expanded to include patents on business methods and software, and those 
types of patents were and are asserted by patent trolls.  
 60 Michael S. Mireles, Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of 
Values and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 439 (2011).  
 61 Id. at 434–35.  
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. at 439 (“[T]he structure of trademark law itself, given the focus of trademark 
law on consumer perception, results in vigorous enforcement and policing of trademark 
rights by trademark holders.”).  
 64 See Best Global Brands 2014, INTERBRAND, http://www.bestglobalbrands.com/ 
2014/ranking/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). Moreover, in one year, the sale of licensed 
products was $187 billion worldwide. See The Top 125 Global Licensors, GLOBAL LICENSE! 
(Mar. 1, 2010), http://licensemag.com/license-global/top-125-global-licensors.  
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licensing.65 Again, trademark doctrine and policy encourage this 
behavior.  
The trademark bully ordinarily uses its mark in commerce. 
Indeed, the trademark owner must use the mark in order to 
retain legal rights associated with the mark. Thus, one of the 
arguably defining characteristics of a troll is not present—the 
trademark owner or bully is practicing the intellectual property.  
An additional question concerns the scope of the 
trademark-bullying problem. The reports regarding trademark 
bullying are somewhat conflicting.66 This may be because of the 
difficulty in defining what is a trademark bully or what is 
trademark-bullying behavior. Again, the practice of enforcing a 
mark is encouraged under trademark law and policy, and thus 
identifying exactly when a party has exceeded the scope of the 
legal protection of its mark is not clear in many cases. For 
example, the USPTO produced a study examining whether the 
trademark-bullying issue was a problem.67 The study stated:  
Most of the direct respondents claimed at least some degree of 
first-hand knowledge of instances where unduly aggressive trademark 
litigation or pre-litigation tactics (e.g., cease-and-desist letters) were 
targeted at a small business . . . . When asked if they currently 
encounter the problem of other trademark owners using their 
 
 65 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007) (“Producers are able to frame just about any argument 
for broader protection in terms of consumer expectations, which they are in position to 
influence systematically through marketing. Moreover, once courts and Congress began to 
expand trademark law and committed it to consumer understanding, expansion became 
self-reinforcing—broader protection begets consumer expectations of greater control, 
which begets even broader protection.”); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights 
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907–08 (2007) (explaining why 
licensing markets emerge when no licenses are needed); Michael A. Johnson, The Waning 
Consumer Protection Rationale of Trademark Law: Overprotective Courts and the Path to 
Stifling Post-Sale Consumer Use, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1320, 1355 (2011) (“The 
proliferation of product placements, cease and desist letters from mark owners in 
response to unauthorized post-sale uses, and overly protectionist court decisions have all 
shaped consumer expectations so that consumers now believe that virtually any post-sale 
use of a mark must be authorized.”); Mireles, supra note 60.  
 66 For additional discussion of the evidence of trademark bullying, see Michael S. 
Mireles, The Nuclear Option: Aesthetic Functionality to Curb Overreaching Trademark 
Claims, 13 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L., 281, 282–89 (2013) [hereinafter 
Mireles, Nuclear Option]. For discussion of trademark bullying and its harmful effects, 
see Grinvald, supra note 58, at 625; Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (2012); Jason R. Brege & Kelli A. 
Ovies, Taking Down Trademark Bullying: Sketching the Contours of a Trademark Notice 
and Takedown Statute, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & PROP. L. 392 (2012); Jessica M. Kiser, 
To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark 
Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211 (2014).  
 67 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK 
LITIGATION TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND 
PREVENT COUNTERFEITING (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigation 
Report_final_2011April27.pdf.  
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trademark rights to harass and intimidate another business beyond 
what the law might be reasonably interpreted to allow (e.g., is 
“trademark bullying a problem”), few commenters explicitly addressed 
whether and to what extent this issue is a significant problem. Given 
the limited number of comments and the varied nature of the 
commenters [sic] own experiences, the comments may be better 
viewed as anecdotal.68 
The USPTO went on to state that “[s]ome commenters explained 
that trademark owners have an obligation to police their marks, 
and the cease-and-desist letter is a necessary, cost-effective part 
of the process.”69 The USPTO further noted that “[a] handful of 
small business owners explained that they withdrew their 
trademark applications after receiving a cease-and-desist 
letter.”70 Two studies, one by Professor Port and the other by 
Professor Gallagher, both support the assertion that 
over-enforcement of trademark claims may exist.71 There are 
numerous anecdotal examples of trademark bullying and 
attempts to document trademark-bullying practices.72 Thus, the 
question of whether trademark bullying is a widespread problem 
is unclear, and this is, in part, because of the difficult definitional 
issues concerning the concept. The supposed trademark bully is, 
however, an entity that uses a mark in which a substantial 
amount of goodwill has been cultivated and attempts to protect 
that mark.  
Once trademark bullying is appropriately separated from 
trolling behavior then the question becomes why there are not 
more reports of actual trademark trolls. As discussed before, this 
Paper argues that there are at least eight reasons why a 
trademark troll problem is unlikely to develop in the United 
States.  
B.  The Reasons Why There Is Not a Trademark Troll Problem 
in the United States 
This section discusses eight reasons why there is not a 
trademark troll problem in the United States. The reasons 
include: the trademark use requirement, Congress’ and ICANN’s 
response to issues concerning domain names, the availability and 
widespread use of inter partes administrative proceedings at the 
 
 68 Id. at 18. 
 69 Id. at 19.  
 70 Id. at 18.  
 71 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 585, 631 (2008); William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright 
Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 
496 (2012).  
 72 See Mireles, Nuclear Option, supra note 66, at 288.  
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USPTO, Supreme Court precedent addressed to patent trolls 
applied in trademark cases, litigation and strategic advantages 
available to patent trolls not present in trademark cases, 
enforcement of consumer protection laws against patent trolls, 
shared appellate jurisdiction over trademark cases, and an early 
appellate case dealing harshly with a trademark troll.  
1. The Trademark Use Requirement 
This section discusses the trademark use requirement and 
how it underlies other doctrines in trademark law which prevent 
a trademark troll problem from developing in the United States. 
Those additional doctrines include abandonment, the prohibition 
against assignments in gross, and the requirement that licensing 
not be naked.  
a. Common Law and Lanham Act Use Requirement 
The main reason there are not more reports of trademark 
trolls in the United States is because of the fundamental 
requirement under U.S. trademark law that a trademark owner 
must use the mark in commerce to acquire and maintain rights.73 
Ancillary to this requirement, U.S. trademark law also requires 
that an assignment of a trademark must not be in gross and that 
a license of a trademark must not be “naked.”74 While 
U.S. trademark law recognizes the ability of some trademark 
owners to acquire trademark rights without use, such as with 
intent to use applications or based on foreign use, U.S. law still 
requires ultimate use by the trademark owner to secure 
trademark rights.75 U.S. trademark law recognizes that a 
 
 73 Most countries do not require use as a prerequisite for “either or both registration 
or renewal.” See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 19:1.75 (4th ed. 2014) (noting only Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, 
the Philippines, and the United States require use for registration and/or renewal). At 
least two commentators have noted that the “use” requirement prevents a trademark troll 
problem from developing. See David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls 
Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1064–65 (2009) 
(citing Gwilym Roberts, Patent Trolls—New Name—Old Problem?, CIPA J., Aug. 2005, at 
523). Moreover, one commentator has analyzed a Seventh Circuit case which canceled a 
purported trademark troll’s mark because of a failure to use the mark. See Folgers, supra 
note 23. Folgers explains that the Seventh Circuit properly canceled the trademark 
registration of the supposed troll based on a finding of a lack of use. See id. at 452–55. 
Folgers also discusses how the cancellation process is an advantageous device to deter 
trolls who fail to satisfy the use requirement under the Lanham Act. See id. at 464−70. 
 74 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 33–34 (1995).  
 75 See Karol A. Kepchar, Protecting Trademarks: Common Law, Statutes and 
Treaties, SL082 ALI-ABA 39, 43 (2006) (“The only exception to the use requirement in the 
United States applies to a foreign applicant relying on Paris Convention rights. However, 
such foreign applicant must use the mark in the United States in order to enforce and 
maintain the registration and avoid abandonment of the mark.”); 5 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:19 (4th ed. 2014) 
(“While use as a mark in the United States is not required to obtain a registration under 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
828 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
trademark owner must file affidavits of use to maintain the 
registration, and a trademark that is not used may be considered 
abandoned.76  
As discussed previously, the defining characteristic of a troll 
is failure to practice the intellectual property. Because the owner 
of the trademark must “use” the trademark to acquire and 
maintain rights, it is highly unlikely that the owner of a 
trademark who enforces its mark will also not “practice” the 
intellectual property. Practice of a trademark is use of the 
trademark.  
The use requirement in U.S. trademark law has its origins in 
the common law.77 In order to acquire trademark rights, a 
purported trademark owner needs to use the mark in 
commerce.78 Thus, common law priority contests concerning the 
ownership of marks are determined by resort to who used the 
mark first.79 Moreover, the importance of the use requirement at 
common law is exemplified by the common law’s treatment of the 
geographic extent of trademark protection. Essentially, a 
trademark owner’s rights only extended to the geographic area in 
which the trademark owner actually used the mark and where it 
might naturally expand.80 For example, in the seminal case 
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated:  
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right 
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with 
which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part of 
the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark 
grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to 
designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to 
protect his good will against the sale of another’s product as his; and it 
is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing 
business . . . .  
 
§ 44 or a Madrid Protocol extension of protection under § 66(a), use is required within a 
reasonable time or the protection is subject to cancellation for abandonment. And under 
§ 8 or § 71, foreign owners are required, as are all registrants, to file during the fifth year 
of registration an affidavit that the mark . . . is in use in the United States.”). 
 76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012). 
 77 See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 250 (4th ed. 2014) (“For the establishment of rights at 
common law, actual use remains a precondition.”). 
 78 See Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“Ownership of a mark requires a combination of both appropriation and use in trade. 
Thus, neither conception of the mark, nor advertising alone establishes trademark rights 
at common law.”) (citations omitted). 
 79 See id. at 1265 (“The exclusive right to a trademark belongs to one who first uses 
it in connection with specified goods.”).  
 80 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918).  
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 It results that the adoption of a trade-mark does not, at least in the 
absence of some valid legislation enacted for the purpose, project the 
right of protection in advance of the extension of the trade, or operate 
as a claim of territorial rights over areas into which it thereafter may 
be deemed desirable to extend the trade.81  
Additionally, the federal Lanham Act provides that use is 
generally a prerequisite to obtaining federal trademark rights. 
Indeed, concerning the definition of a trademark, the Lanham 
Act in section 45 provides:  
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or 
any combination thereof— 
 (1) used by a person, or 
 (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register established by this 
chapter . . . .82  
Section 45 of the Lanham Act further defines “use in commerce” 
as:  
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the 
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a 
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in 
use in commerce— 
(1) on goods when— 
 (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or 
the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed 
thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement 
impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their 
sale . . . .83 
As recognized by the definition of a trademark, there are two 
main types of trademark applications: the use-based application 
and the intent-to-use-based application. The intent-to-use-based 
application rests on a statement of actual use.84 Under 
 
 81 Id. For a discussion of the common law and federal Lanham Act provision 
concerning geographic use, see generally David S. Welkowitz, The Problem of Concurrent 
Use of Trademarks: An Old/New Proposal, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 315 (1994).  
 82 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Section 1127 also includes a definition 
of service marks that also requires use. Id.  
 83 Id. Section 1127 also includes a definition of “use in commerce” in connection with 
services. Id.  
 84 Id. § 1051(a). Moreover, § 1051(a)(3)(D) requires that: 
to the best of the verifier’s knowledge and belief, no other person has the right 
to use such mark in commerce either in the identical form thereof or in such 
near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with 
the goods of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive. 
Id. § 1051(a)(3)(D). It also provides an exception for concurrent use applications. Id. 
(“[E]xcept that, in the case of every application claiming concurrent use, the applicant 
shall—(i) state exceptions to the claim of exclusive use; and (ii) shall specify, to the extent 
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§ 1051(a)(1)–(3), the applicant must verify facts concerning the 
use of the mark.85 These requirements ensure that the mark has 
been used in commerce. Moreover, if a trademark applicant 
receives a trademark registration and did not actually use the 
mark, the trademark applicant has committed fraud and the 
application is void.86 
While the Lanham Act allows for a trademark registrant to 
reserve a priority date through an intent-to-use application, the 
trademark registrant must have a bona fide intent to use the 
mark in commerce87 and must ultimately perfect its application 
through actual use of the mark in commerce.88 The trademark 
registrant must demonstrate it actually used the mark in order 
to receive the earlier filing date.89 While this process may appear 
to provide potential trolls the opportunity to obtain intent-to-use 
applications without use to hold up actual users, the trademark 
registrant is likely unable to enforce their mark until they have 
perfected their application through use. Furthermore, a 
trademark applicant with an intent-to-use filing cannot receive a 
final judgment from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
concerning likelihood of confusion and priority.90 The applicant 
must have perfected the application through use to receive a final 
judgment.91  
Moreover, the Lanham Act requires that the applicant swear 
that “no other person has the right to use such mark in commerce 
either in the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance 
thereto as to be likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
 
of the verifier’s knowledge—(I) any concurrent use by others; (II) the goods on or in 
connection with which and the areas in which each concurrent use exists; (III) the periods 
of each use; and (IV) the goods and area for which the applicant desires registration.”). 
 85 Id. § 1051(a).  
 86 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 31:72 (4th ed. 2014) (“The Trademark Board rule is that, in a use-based application, 
when at the time of application there was no use on any of the goods or services specified, 
the application and resulting registration is void . . . .”).  
 87 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(b).  
 88 Id. § 1051(d). Section 15(d)(1) of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent part: 
Within six months after the date on which the notice of allowance with respect 
to a mark is issued . . . to an applicant . . . the applicant shall file in the Patent 
and Trademark Office, together with such number of specimens or facsimiles of 
the mark as used in commerce as may be required by the Director and 
payment of the prescribed fee, a verified statement that the mark is in use in 
commerce and specifying the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in 
commerce and those goods or services specified in the notice of allowance on or 
in connection with which the mark is used in commerce. 
Id. Section 15(d)(2) also allows applicants to apply for extensions of time to file a 
statement of use. See id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. § 1058.  
 91 Id. For additional discussion, see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 73, § 20:27.  
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or to deceive.”92 The Lanham Act also prohibits the assignment of 
intent-to-use applications prior to perfection of the use.93 This 
prohibition was added to the Lanham Act to prevent the 
development of a market for assignments of intent-to-use 
applications and effectively prevents the “trafficking” of marks 
that may be used against subsequent users.94 Additionally, the 
Lanham Act requires that registered mark owners continue to 
submit affidavits at certain time periods to demonstrate actual 
use in commerce.95 
Notably, the requirements concerning priority of use have 
led potential trademark owners to conduct relatively extensive 
searches before adopting a mark or filing a federal registration 
for a mark to determine if there is a confusingly similar prior use 
of the mark. Thus, the opportunity for a trademark troll to lie in 
wait for an unsuspecting trademark owner to develop goodwill 
surrounding the mark is less likely. The potential trademark 
owner, who consults with competent counsel, will have conducted 
an extensive search and will know whether a pre-existing, 
confusingly similar use exists within the United States.96 
Moreover, the nature of the trademark use is one that is a public 
use. By contrast, it is apparently not uncommon in some 
industries for researchers to fail to search for patents before 
researching in their field for fear of a finding of willful 
infringement.97 Indeed, “[w]hen their research leads to an 
invention, their patent lawyers commonly don’t conduct a search 
for prior patents before seeking their own protection in the 
Patent and Trademark Office.”98 It is also difficult to discover 
prior art in some fields, such as software, that have been subject 
to patent trolls. Trademark law benefits from the requirements 
of priority of use and the nature of a trademark use. The use is 
 
 92 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(D). 
 93 See id. § 1060(a) (“Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, no application to 
register a mark under section 1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to the filing of 
an amendment under section 1051(c) of this title to bring the application into conformity 
with section 1051(a) of this title or the filing of the verified statement of use under section 
1051(d) of this title . . . .”). 
 94 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 77, at 339 (citing S. Rep. No. 100-5115, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988)). 
 95 15 U.S.C. § 1058. 
 96 Indeed, an international search is often undertaken.  
 97 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 31–32 (2009). This practice may be changing in light of Federal Circuit 
precedent. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The state 
of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. If this threshold 
objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been 
known to the accused infringer.”).  
 98 Id.  
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necessarily one available to the public—allowing for relatively 
easy searching of confusingly similar or dilutive marks. 
b. Abandonment  
A trademark owner may lose its rights from failure to use 
because of abandonment under the common law.99 The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition addresses 
abandonment and provides in relevant part:  
(1) In an action for infringement of a trademark, trade name, 
collective mark, or certification mark, it is a defense that the 
designation was abandoned by the party asserting rights in the 
designation prior to the commencement of use by the actor. 
(2) A trademark, trade name, collective mark, or certification mark is 
abandoned if: 
 (a) the party asserting rights in the designation has ceased to use 
the designation with an intent not to resume use; or 
 (b) the designation has lost its significance as a trademark, trade 
name, collective mark, or certification mark as a result of a cessation 
of use or other acts or omissions by the party asserting rights in the 
designation.100 
Section 2(a) of the Restatement sets forth the general common 
law rule for abandonment of a mark through failure to use the 
mark.101 Section 2(b) of the Restatement recognizes that marks 
may become generic, thereby losing their trademark significance, 
through non-use by the trademark owner.102 The Lanham Act 
also recognizes that abandonment may essentially serve as a 
defense to infringement of registered marks and marks enforced 
 
 99 See, e.g., Specht v. Google, Inc., 747 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If Specht 
abandoned and never resumed use of the mark, then Google could not have infringed on 
Specht’s intellectual property when it later released the Android operating system in 
2007.”); Cohen v. Nagle, 76 N.E. 276, 279 (Mass. 1906) (“In such a case the conditions are 
similar to those existing when one having a trade-mark or trade-name abandons it, and 
leaves the name open to a future acquisition of rights in it, as if it had never been 
appropriated. There is no doubt that an abandonment paves the way for future possession 
and property in another person.”). It is important to note that the development of 
abandonment doctrine is intimately tied to trademark law’s concern with preventing a 
likelihood of confusion amongst consumers. Thus, the abandonment doctrine recognizes 
that residual goodwill may present a chance of confusion even without current use of the 
mark and requires intent not to resume use. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 30 cmt. b (1995) (“A trademark may retain significant good will despite a 
period of nonuse. A finding of abandonment can therefore result in the forfeiture of 
valuable rights and can also create the potential for confusion as to the source of goods or 
services by allowing use of the designation by others. Thus, to support a finding of 
abandonment, a court may properly require clear and convincing evidence of the former 
user’s intent not to resume use of the mark.”).  
 100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.  
 101 Id. § 30(2)(a).  
 102 Id. § 30(2)(b).  
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through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act 
provides:  
A mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the following 
occurs: 
 (1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume 
such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. 
Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of 
abandonment. “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark 
made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve 
a right in a mark. 
 (2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of 
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the 
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which 
it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser 
motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under 
this paragraph.103 
Notably, abandonment also applies to foreign marks holders 
under 44(e) of the Lanham Act.104 Thus, a foreign mark holder is 
required to use the mark even though a foreign mark holder may 
not initially have to establish use to obtain a registration.  
c. “In Gross” Assignments and “Naked” Licensing 
Related to abandonment, the common law also required that 
assignments not be made in gross and that licenses not be 
naked.105 Both requirements are arguably based on the use 
 
 103 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). For additional commentary concerning abandonment, see 
Christopher T. Micheletti, Preventing Loss of Trademarks Rights: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Assessments of “Use” and Their Impact on Abandonment Determinations, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 634 (2004).  
 104 See Thomas L. Casagrande, What Must a Foreign Service Mark Holder Do to 
Create and Maintain Trademark Rights in the United States?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1354, 
1356 (2003) (“[T]he concept of ‘abandonment’—the opposite side of the ‘use’ coin—has 
been applied to foreign mark holders and U.S. mark holders alike, and, in fact, the 
Lanham Act defines ‘abandonment’ with explicit reference to ‘use’ . . . .”). There is a 
possibility that a trademark holder could fail to use the mark for several years and not be 
held to have abandoned the mark. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(b)(1) (noting non-use for three 
years creates presumption of abandonment).  
 105 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 33–34. The Lanham Act 
allows assignments of trademark registrations with goodwill. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) 
(“A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall be 
assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part 
of the good will of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark.”). 
For criticism of these doctrines, see Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “with 
Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 776 (2005) (advocating 
“for a change toward free trademark transferability, or assignment ‘with or without’ 
goodwill, to eliminate the ambiguities and inconsistencies created by the current wording 
of Section 10”); Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark 
Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 347 (2007) (advocating “for a more flexible approach to 
assessing the validity of licensing, which will eliminate the inconsistencies resulting from 
the erratic application of quality control”). For additional commentary concerning 
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obligation. Specifically, the requirements recognize that 
trademark rights are based on use of a trademark in connection 
with specific goods and services and the goodwill developed 
around that usage. If assignments were made without the 
goodwill associated with the mark, consumers may be 
confused.106 Further, if licensors fail to control the quality of the 
goods and services sold under the mark, consumers likewise may 
be confused.107  
Because an assignment cannot be in gross, another party 
should not be able to receive trademark rights by assignment 
without actually having been transferred the mark in connection 
with the underlying goodwill.108 Coupled with the use 
requirement, this essentially means that the assignee must use 
the mark in commerce—the assignee must “practice” the mark. 
Moreover, if a trademark owner licenses its trademark to a 
licensee, the trademark owner is required to exercise some level 
of control over the use of the mark by the licensee.109 Again, this 
 
assignments in gross, see BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
BUSINESS TORTS 264–66 (2011).  
 106 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 34 cmt. b. The Comment, in 
relevant part, states:  
Accordingly, courts now evaluate each assignment in light of the circumstances 
of the particular case, including both the terms of the transfer and the nature 
of the assignee's subsequent use. Recent decisions recognize that the central 
inquiry is whether the use of the mark by the assignee is likely to confuse 
prospective purchasers by departing from the expectations created by the 
presence of the trademark. The traditional requirement of an accompanying 
transfer of good will can thus be understood as requiring that the assignment 
not disrupt the existing significance of the mark to consumers.  
Id. 
 107 See id. § 33 cmt. b (“An uncontrolled or ‘naked’ license allows use of the trademark 
on goods or services for which the trademark owner cannot offer a meaningful assurance 
of quality. When a trademark owner fails to exercise reasonable control over the use of 
the mark by a licensee, the presence of the mark on the licensee’s goods or services 
misrepresents their connection with the trademark owner since the mark no longer 
identifies goods or services that are under the control of the owner of the mark. Although 
prospective purchasers may continue to perceive the designation as a trademark, the 
courts have traditionally treated an erosion of the designation’s capacity for accurate 
identification resulting from uncontrolled licensing as a loss of trademark significance, 
thus subjecting the owner of the mark to a claim of abandonment under the rule stated in 
§ 30(2)(b).”).  
 108 See id. § 34. Section 34 provides in relevant part:  
An assignment of ownership transfers the assignor’s priority in the use of the 
designation to the assignee only if the assignee also acquires the line of 
business that is associated with the designation or otherwise maintains 
continuity in the use of the designation by continuing the line of business 
without substantial change. An assignment of ownership that does not 
maintain continuity in the use of the designation can result in abandonment of 
the designation under the rule stated in § 30.  
Id. 
 109 See id. § 33. Section 33 provides, in relevant part, “Failure of the licensor to 
exercise reasonable control over the use of the designation by the licensee can result in 
abandonment of the designation under the rule stated in § 30(2)(b).” Id. Notably, at least 
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assumes that the licensee must use the mark—and must use the 
mark in a certain prescribed manner. Indeed, the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes that usage by a licensee 
can inure to the benefit of the licensor110 and that an assignee 
cannot obtain the priority date of the assignor unless the “line of 
business” is transferred—the prior usage.111 Both of these 
requirements together seem to prohibit the ability of a party who 
receives trademark rights from a trademark owner from 
enforcing its licensed or assigned rights against third parties 
without actually having used or practiced the mark in connection 
with the goods and services. This would seem to exclude those 
parties from the definition of a troll.  
A common tactic or strategy of patent trolls is to acquire 
patents from bankrupt firms.112 Patent trolls can obtain patents 
for a very low cost and then use those patents to hold up other 
firms that actually practice the invention. The use requirement 
and the rules concerning assignment in gross and naked 
licensing essentially prohibit the enforcement of marks acquired 
in a bankruptcy sale against other users. For example, Borders, a 
large retail bookseller, declared bankruptcy. Arguably, there 
could be substantial goodwill remaining in the “Borders” mark.113 
A trademark troll could purchase the Borders mark. However, 
the trademark troll would necessarily have to also acquire the 
underlying goodwill with the mark and would need to continue to 
use the mark in commerce. The trademark troll may have a 
period of time during which it could retain the rights to the mark 
without use; however, a competent trademark attorney should be 
able to discover that the trademark troll owns the mark and 
avoid a holdup situation by avoiding usage of a similar mark in a 
similar line of business. Moreover, the entire problem is likely 
avoided in the first instance because competent counsel should 
have completed a full clearance search discovering the use of 
“Borders” in connection with retail book sales. Thus, a trademark 
troll is unlikely to be able to take advantage of a 
business/litigation model premised on purchasing trademarks for 
 
one court has stated that attempts to license can serve as evidence of use. See Condom 
Sense v. Alshalabi, 390 S.W.3d 734, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012). 
 110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 (“If the licensor exercises 
reasonable control over the nature and quality of the goods, services, or business on which 
the designation is used by the licensee, any rights in the designation arising from the 
licensee’s use accrue to the benefit of the licensor.”).  
 111 Id. § 33 cmt. c (“An assignee does not succeed to the assignor’s priority in the use 
of the designation unless the transaction permits the assignee to continue the line of 
business with which the mark is associated.”).  
 112 See Bryant, supra note 29, at 691 (“Patent trolls often acquire patents from 
bankrupt firms . . . .”).  
 113 Thanks to Ann-Michele Hart for this example.  
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a very low price at a bankruptcy sale and monetizing those 
trademarks through litigation.  
Because of the enduring requirement of use of a trademark 
in U.S. trademark law, it is unlikely that trademark enforcement 
practices by trademark owners will be considered trolling 
behavior. Trademark owners are required to use their marks in 
commerce—to practice the marks—and if they do not, they may 
not have any trademark rights at all.114 This is usually the case 
whether the trademark owner is attempting to license or assign 
the trademark.  
2. Domain Names and Trademark Issues 
An area of trademark practice that was ripe for enforcement 
abuse involved Internet domain names. Essentially, a person 
would ascertain that an entity owned a particular trademark, 
usually consisting solely of a word, and that person would 
register the domain name consisting of that trademark or a 
slight variation of it. The so-called “domain name squatter” 
would then attempt to “hold up” the trademark owner—force the 
trademark owner to pay the domain name squatter in exchange 
for the domain name. Domain name squatting was rampant in 
the early days of the Internet and is still a problem. Congress 
and ICANN responded to this problem with tailored legislation 
and policies, respectively, designed to provide quick and effective 
relief to trademark owners. The problem of domain name 
squatting for top-level domain names recently arose because of 
the availability for registration of top-level domain names; 
however, ICANN developed policies designed to intercept any 
potential issues. The legislation and policies prevent the 
likelihood of a troll-like problem developing in this area of 
trademark practice.  
Technically, however, domain name squatting is not trolling 
behavior similar to the actions taken by a patent troll. A patent 
troll ordinarily does legally own the patent. The patent troll is 
not practicing the patent. The domain name owner does legally 
own the domain name registration at the time of registration; 
however, it may not own trademark rights in the name itself, 
although that question may depend on whether the domain name 
holder is actually using the name in connection with goods and 
services. If the domain name holder is making a good faith use of 
the name in connection with goods and services that is not 
confusingly similar or does not dilute the trademark of the 
trademark owner, then there may not be a trademark problem. 
 
 114 I am not arguing that patent law should have a “practice” requirement.  
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In some ways, however, the domain name squatter is analogous 
to the patent troll. For example, the domain name squatter may 
be similar to a patent troll who is relying on a low-quality patent 
to extract licensing fees from a patent owner. The domain name 
squatter similarly has obtained rights to a domain name with 
ostensible trademark rights and is attempting to obtain 
undeserved payment from the trademark owner.  
a. The Anticybersquatting Act 
An examination of the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA)115 and the ICANN Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy demonstrates how trademark squatting in the 
domain name arena has been lessened. The ACPA creates a 
federal cause of action against an individual who—with bad faith 
intent to profit—registers, traffics, or uses a domain name that is 
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark owned by 
another.116 Importantly, the statute does not require an analysis 
of the similarity of goods and services, as ordinary trademark 
infringement analysis does.117 This modification to the trademark 
infringement inquiry makes it easier for a trademark holder to 
address potential cybersquatting. The action also extends 
protection to famous marks from dilutive use by identical or 
confusingly similar domain names.118 One critical portion of the 
statute addresses the definition of “bad faith intent to profit.” 
This part of the statute importantly distinguishes between 
conduct that is considered proper or improper with respect to 
registering domain names consisting of a trademark of another. 
Courts are provided with several factors to determine whether 
“bad faith intent to profit” exists.119 
 
 115 See generally Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 116 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).  
 117 Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 n.11 (2d Cir. 
2000).  
 118 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).  
 119 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). The relevant sections provide:  
 (i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under 
subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to— 
 (I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if 
any, in the domain name; 
 (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of 
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that 
person; 
 (III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with 
the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 
 (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a 
site accessible under the domain name; 
 (V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online 
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the 
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The first three factors are directed to any pre-existing legal 
rights that a person may have had under the domain name.120 
Those pre-existing legal rights may be based upon an actual use 
of the domain name, which may serve as the basis of intellectual 
property rights through trademark use or copyright law. 
Subsection IV recognizes that the person may be making a 
legally protected use of another’s trademark—essentially a use 
that cannot be prohibited under trademark law, such as fair 
use.121 The ACPA is attempting to not provide trademark rights 
greater than those already accorded under trademark law except 
to prevent the specific, targeted harm. Subsection V also focuses 
on the usage of the particular mark in ascertaining whether 
there is bad faith by examining the intent of the squatter to 
divert consumers by confusing them or diluting the mark.122 The 
next three factors are concerned with specific proof that the 
squatter is directing its efforts toward “holding up” the 
trademark owner by examining whether they are selling domain 
names without use, hiding their identity, or warehousing domain 
names.123 The last factor is directed to ensuring that the alleged 
squatter simply did not obtain a domain name in a term without 
much trademark significance, and is not itself a victim of an 
 
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the 
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the 
site; 
 (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain 
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without 
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide 
offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a 
pattern of such conduct; 
 (VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact 
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the 
person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or 
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
 (VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names 
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of 
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain 
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time 
of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties; and 
 (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain 
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning 
of subsection (c) of this section. 
 (ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in 
any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use 
or otherwise lawful. 
Id. at § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).  
 120 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(III).  
 121 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).  
 122 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).  
 123 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI)–(VIII).  
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
2015] Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States? 839 
overzealous trademark owner.124 Importantly, the legislation’s 
remedies are specifically designed to address the harm caused by 
cybersquatting by providing for cancellation and forfeiture of the 
domain name by court order.125 In addition, the statute provides 
for an “in rem” action against the domain name if the trademark 
owner cannot identify the cybersquatter.126 The availability of 
this relatively well-structured legislation addresses the problem 
of cybersquatters and prevents abuse of the domain name 
registration system.127  
b. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
ICANN also offers a Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP), which addresses how conflicts over 
domain names can be resolved.128 The UDRP provides quick and 
effective relief to domain name squatting.129 Indeed, disputes can 
be resolved in as little as forty-five days from initiation of the 
action.130 
The UDRP is incorporated into registration agreements for 
domain names and mandates an administrative resolution of 
disputes concerning domain names between two parties.131 The 
UDRP is similar to the ACPA in some respects. The UDRP states 
that disputes concerning domain names are resolved pursuant to 
the policy if:  
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a 
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and 
 
 124 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).  
 125 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C).  
 126 Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A).  
 127 Notably, Professor Goldman has compared the Vermont legislation targeted at 
bad faith patent assertions to the ACPA. See Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s 
First Anti-patent Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.co 
m/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/ 
[hereinafter Goldman, Vermont]. Professor Goldman notes that cybersquatting was 
squashed under the ACPA and that it “is fairly characterized as a solid success.” Id.; see 
also Eric Goldman, The Best and Worst Internet Laws, INFORMIT (Apr. 20, 2007), 
https://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=717374&seqNum=2. Professor Goldman 
does state, however, that some tactics have changed since the ’90s, resulting in trademark 
abuse, such as using the ACPA to attack gripers. Id. Congress could pass legislation 
similar to the ACPA to address patent trolls.  
 128 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). For a detailed analysis of 
the UDRP, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy”—Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002).  
 129 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 128. 
 130 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 25A:21 (“It is designed to be a simple, quick, and 
inexpensive method of determining if a domain name has been the subject of 
cybersquatting. If the time limits are adhered to, a dispute can be resolved quickly—
within 45 days of the initial filing of a complaint.”).  
 131 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 128. 
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(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain 
name; and 
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad 
faith.132 
The UDRP similarly seeks to resolve whether a domain 
name registrant is attempting to hold up a trademark holder by 
discerning whether the domain name registrant has some 
legitimate claim to the domain name or is merely attempting to 
extract payments from a trademark holder. The key inquiries are 
whether the domain name holder has a “right[] or [a] legitimate 
interest[]” with respect to the domain name and has registered 
and is using the domain name in bad faith.133 The following facts 
may demonstrate a “legitimate interest[]” in the domain name:  
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable 
preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the 
domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or 
services; or 
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been 
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no 
trademark or service mark rights; or 
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the 
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly 
divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at 
issue.134 
These factors recognize that multiple parties may have 
legitimate interests in the same domain name.135 A party may be 
able to produce evidence of intent to offer goods and services 
under the mark which may be sufficiently different from those 
offered by the trademark owner.136 Thus, the trademark owner 
may not have a legitimate trademark claim against the domain 
name registrant.137 A party may be able to demonstrate that they 
are known by the domain name even without trademark 
rights.138 Finally, the registrant may be making use of another’s 
trademark in a way that is not recognized as an infringement 
because of a defense or exemption from trademark infringement 
or dilution.139 This fact recognizes that the underlying interest 
 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.  
 135 See id.  
 136 See id.  
 137 See id.  
 138 Id.  
 139 See id.  
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protected by the dispute resolution policy in the challenger is 
based upon trademark principles.140  
The factors for bad faith point to activity which 
demonstrates that the registrant is essentially registering the 
domain name to hold up the trademark owner. The factors for 
bad faith include:  
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have 
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, 
renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the 
complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to 
a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess 
of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain 
name; or 
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the 
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a 
corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a 
pattern of such conduct; or 
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
disrupting the business of a competitor; or 
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to 
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other 
on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the 
complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on 
your web site or location.141 
The first factor expressly takes into account attempts to 
extract undeserved payments from the trademark owner by 
attempting to transfer the domain name to the trademark 
owner.142 The second factor examines whether a registrant has a 
history of registering marks for the purpose of preventing the 
owner of the mark from using it.143 The third factor looks to 
intent to interfere with the business of a competitor.144 Finally, 
the last factor considers attempts to create a likelihood of 
confusion to divert consumers to another website for commercial 
gain.145  
The UDRP provides for the cancellation and transfer of a 
domain name registration as a remedy. These remedies 
effectively end the dispute and any leverage that a domain name 
squatter may have had against the legitimate trademark owner. 
 
 140 See id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id.  
 143 Id.  
 144 Id.  
 145 Id.  
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In addition to the UDRP, some domain name registries also offer 
“Rights Protection Mechanisms . . . such as a ‘sunrise’ procedure 
during their pre-launch phase by which rights holders may 
defensively register or object to the registration of domain names 
in certain circumstances.”146 This type of procedure further 
protects trademark owners from abusive cybersquatters and 
reduces the likelihood of holdups. The UDRP is widely considered 
a successful policy in addressing domain name disputes. Notably, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has 
administered over 30,000 cases using the UDRP.147 
Moreover, bona fide domain name registrants, who may also 
be the legitimate trademark owners, are protected from abuse of 
the dispute resolution process by a specific provision of the 
Lanham Act.148 Section 1114(2)(D)(iv) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code 
provides:  
If a registrar, registry, or other registration authority takes an action 
described under clause (ii) based on a knowing and material 
misrepresentation by any other person that a domain name is 
identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the person 
making the knowing and material misrepresentation shall be liable 
for any damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, incurred by the 
domain name registrant as a result of such action. The court may also 
grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including the 
reactivation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to 
the domain name registrant.149  
This provision essentially allows a legitimate trademark 
owner to recover “damages[,] . . . costs[,] and attorney fees” based 
on “‘abuse of process’ or ‘malicious prosecution’” under the 
dispute resolution process.150 The Lanham Act ultimately 
protects trademark owners from frivolous suits and deters the 
assertion of those suits.  
c. Top-Level Domain Names 
Based on the experience developed through dealing with 
domain name squatting, ICANN has been able to effectively plan 
for potential cybersquatting issues. In 2005, ICANN began 
investigating whether to allow the registration of new generic 
 
 146 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Generic Top-level Domains, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).  
 147 Domain Name Dispute Resolution, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo. 
int/amc/en/domains/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
 148 This abuse is often called “reverse domain name hijacking.” See 5 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 75, § 25A:38 (citing Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/rules-be-2012-02-25-en (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2015)).  
 149 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv) (2012).  
 150 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 25A:38.  
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
2015] Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States? 843 
top-level domain names.151 A top-level domain name is often 
referred to as a gTLD and includes, for example, .com or .net.152 
The opportunity to register a top-level domain name creates 
obvious issues with respect to trademark rights.153 Opportunistic 
cybersquatters could attempt to register the trademarks of other 
entities and then hold up the trademark owners. However, 
ICANN began to develop policies for addressing the potential for 
abuse of the system after deciding to move forward with offering 
generic top-level domain names for registration.154 The policies 
include Legal Rights Objections, the Uniform Rapid Suspension 
System, Trademark Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, and the Trademark Clearinghouse.  
First, ICANN took a proactive approach to ensure that 
rampant domain name squatting would not occur in the first 
instance.155 ICANN allowed trademark owners to file “Legal 
Rights Objection[s]” against applicants for top-level domain 
names prior to the grant of the name.156 This procedure was 
 
 151 About the Program, ICANN, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/program (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2014). For a discussion of the history concerning gTLDs and ICANN, see 
Daniela Michele Spencer, Much Ado About Nothing: ICANN’s New GTLDs, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 865, 870–72 (2014). ICANN also required a relatively high fee to attempt 
register a gTLD as well as a demonstration of financial resources to support the registry. 
Id. at 872 (“The applicant must pay $185,000 for the evaluation fee, pay for ongoing 
registry operational costs, and ‘demonstrate sufficient financial depth to keep the registry 
fully operational . . . .’”) (citing Benefits & Risks of Operating a New gTLD, ICANN, 
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/benefits-risks (last visited Jan. 13, 2015)). “The hefty 
$185,000 application fee . . . deters cybersquatters from registering [a] gTLD.” Brandon 
Marsh, ICANN’T Help Myself: Beneficial Adjustments to the New Generic Top-Level 
Domain Name Expansion Process, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 195, 198 (2013). 
ICANN also instituted a background check of all new registrants which included potential 
disqualification because of past “[c]onviction of a felony or misdemeanor relating to fraud, 
breach of fiduciary duty, . . . [and i]nvolvement in . . . [past] cybersquatting activit[ies],” 
among other grounds. Terence P. Ross, Understanding ICANN’s New Top-Level Domain 
Name Program, in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW: LEADING LAWS 
ON EXAMINING PRIVACY ISSUES, ADDRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS, AND RESPONDING TO 
RECENT IT TRENDS 41, 46–47 (Aspatore 2011).  
 152 New gTLD Fast Facts, ICANN, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/program (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2015).  
 153 See Dennis S. Prahl & Eric Null, The New Generic Top-Level Domain Program: A 
New Era of Risk for Trademark Owners and the Internet, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1757, 
1797–99 (2011) (discussing protecting trademarks under new gTLD regime).  
 154 For additional commentary concerning the new gTLD system, including measures 
to protect trademark rights, see id. and Marsh, supra note 151, at 196 (proposing to 
“strengthen the new rights protection mechanisms”).  
 155 Notably, ICANN solicited input from various stakeholders before developing its 
policies.  
 156 THE INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NOS., GTLD APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK, 
MODULE 3, at 3-4 (2012), available at http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb/ 
objection-procedures-04jun12-en.pdf; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER END REPORT ON LEGAL RIGHTS OBJECTION 
PROCEDURE 2013, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
amc/en/docs/lroreport.pdf (“The GNSO released its Final Report on the Introduction of 
New Generic Top-Level Domains in August 2007, including 19 recommendations for 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:16 PM 
844 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
available for almost a year for new applications for top-level 
domain names and allowed an action similar to a trademark 
opposition to be filed against an application. The Applicant 
Guidebook, designed to provide assistance to potential users of 
the new top-level domain name program, sets forth the criteria 
for determining whether there are adequate grounds for a Legal 
Rights Objection.157 The criteria include:  
whether the potential use of the applied-for gTLD by the applicant 
takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation 
of the objector’s registered or unregistered trademark or service mark 
(“mark”) or IGO name or acronym (as identified in the treaty 
establishing the organization), or unjustifiably impairs the distinctive 
character or the reputation of the objector’s mark or IGO name or 
acronym, or otherwise creates an impermissible likelihood of 
confusion between the applied-for gTLD and the objector’s mark or 
IGO name or acronym.158 
The Applicant Guidebook also provides a list of non-exclusive 
factors to determine whether a Legal Rights Objection should be 
sustained.159 The non-exclusive factors are, in part, directed to a 
 
implementing a program for the introduction of new gTLDs. Among the recommendations 
were that ‘[s]trings must not infringe the existing legal rights of others’ (Recommendation 
3) and that ‘[d]ispute resolution and challenge processes must be established prior to the 
start of the process’ (Recommendation 12).”). 
 157 THE INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NOS., supra note 156, at 3-18.  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 3-19. The non-exclusive list of factors to be considered include:  
1. Whether the applied-for gTLD is identical or similar, including in 
appearance, phonetic sound, or meaning, to the objector’s existing mark.  
2. Whether the objector’s acquisition and use of rights in the mark has been 
bona fide. 
3. Whether and to what extent there is recognition in the relevant sector of the 
public of the sign corresponding to the gTLD, as the mark of the objector, of the 
applicant or of a third party. 
4. Applicant’s intent in applying for the gTLD, including whether the 
applicant, at the time of application for the gTLD, had knowledge of the 
objector’s mark, or could not have reasonably been unaware of that mark, and 
including whether the applicant has engaged in a pattern of conduct whereby 
it applied for or operates TLDs or registrations in TLDs which are identical or 
confusingly similar to the marks of others. 
5. Whether and to what extent the applicant has used, or has made 
demonstrable preparations to use, the sign corresponding to the gTLD in 
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a bona fide provision 
of information in a way that does not interfere with the legitimate exercise by 
the objector of its mark rights. 
6. Whether the applicant has marks or other intellectual property rights in the 
sign corresponding to the gTLD, and, if so, whether any acquisition of such a 
right in the sign, and use of the sign, has been bona fide, and whether the 
purported or likely use of the gTLD by the applicant is consistent with such 
acquisition or use. 
7. Whether and to what extent the applicant has been commonly known by the 
sign corresponding to the gTLD, and if so, whether any purported or likely use 
of the gTLD by the applicant is consistent therewith and bona fide. 
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determination of the good faith of the applicant and objector, 
particularly in examining whether either party has a bona fide 
right to use the particular name.160 Similar to the UDRP and the 
Anticybersquatting Act, Legal Rights Objections provide an 
opportunity to resolve a dispute concerning a domain name 
relatively quickly, prior to its registration. Notably, the fees for 
resolving a Legal Rights Objection case were set at a relatively 
low rate—$10,000 for a single panelist.161 WIPO administered 
the dispute resolution of the Legal Rights Objections and 
released a report (WIPO Top-Level Domains Report) detailing its 
experience.162 Seventy-one Legal Rights Objections were filed 
within an almost one-year period of time, and sixty-nine cases 
were heard by WIPO panels.163 Of the sixty-nine cases, “[s]ix 
proceedings were terminated, in 3 cases due to the withdrawal of 
gTLD applications.”164 “Expert panels upheld 4 legal rights 
objections, with dissenting opinions in 3 of these cases. Expert 
panels rejected 59 legal rights objections.”165 The cases were also 
resolved in an average of around fifty days.166 The WIPO 
Top-Level Domains Report also noted that the presence of the 
Legal Rights Objections process may have deterred potential 
squatters from filing applications for top-level domain names.167 
ICANN also established a complement to the UDRP, which 
is the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URSS). The URSS is 
designed to resolve domain name disputes in new top-level 
domains involving clear cases of trademark infringement. The 
URSS has three basic requirements: first, a confusingly similar 
use of a trademark; second, the user has no legitimate right or 
interest in the mark; and third, the domain name is being used in 
 
8. Whether the applicant’s intended use of the gTLD would create a likelihood 
of confusion with the objector’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, 
or endorsement of the gTLD.  
Id.  
 160 Id.  
 161 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 156, at 7. 
 162 Id. at 3. 
 163 Id. at 10–11.  
 164 Id. at 11.  
 165 Id. at 11.  
 166 Id. at 11.  
 167 Id. at 13 (“Although this remains a matter of speculation, it appears reasonable to 
presume that the existence itself of the pre-delegation Legal Rights Objection mechanism, 
including published decision criteria and consideration factors, may have prevented a 
number of potentially improper gTLD applications from being made.”). See generally 
Legal Rights Objections Under ICANN’s New gTLD Program, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/lro (last visited Jan. 15, 2015), and WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 156, at 15–17, for a description of the marks and 
the identities of the objector and applicant, as well as the resolution of the matter. 
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bad faith.168 The URSS also includes a non-exclusive list of 
factors to determine whether a domain name is used in bad 
faith.169 Notably, the URSS factors are similar to the UDRP. The 
remedy under the URSS is suspension of the domain name.  
In addition to the URSS, ICANN also established the 
Trademark Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedures 
(Trademark PDDRP), which are designed to address disputes 
concerning the actions of a top-level domain name registry and 
trademarks.170 “The Trademark PDDRP generally address[] a 
Registry Operator’s complicity in trademark infringement on the 
first or second level of a New gTLD.”171 These rules allow the 
trademark owner to challenge the Registry Operator itself.172 The 
 
 168 UNIFORM RAPID SUSPENSION SYSTEM (URS) §§ 1.2.6.1–1.2.6.3 (2013), available at 
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/urs/procedure-01mar13-en.pdf.  
 169 Id. § 1.2.6.3. The factors include:  
 a. Registrant has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the 
purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring the domain name 
registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service 
mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in 
excess of documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; 
or  
 b. Registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the 
trademark holder or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding 
domain name, provided that Registrant has engaged in a pattern of such 
conduct; or  
 c. Registrant registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
disrupting the business of a competitor; or  
 d. By using the domain name Registrant has intentionally attempted to 
attract for commercial gain, Internet users to Registrant’s web site or other 
on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s 
mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of Registrant’s 
web site or location or of a product or service on that web site or location. 
Id.  
 170 Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedures (PDDRP), ICANN, http://newgtlds. 
icann.org/en/program-status/pddrp (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).  
 171 Id.  
 172 For example, the rules concerning the first level of a new top-level domain name 
provide that a complainant must prove:  
by clear and convincing evidence, that the registry operator’s affirmative 
conduct in its operation or use of its gTLD string that is identical or 
confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark, causes or materially contributes 
to the gTLD doing one of the following:  
(a) taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation 
of the complainant’s mark; or  
(b) impairing the distinctive character or the reputation of the 
complainant’s mark; or  
(c) creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark.  
 An example of infringement at the top-level is where a TLD string is identical 
to a trademark and then the registry operator holds itself out as the 
beneficiary of the mark. 
TRADEMARK POST-DELEGATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE (TRADEMARK PDDRP) 
§ 6.1 (2012), available at http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb/pddrp-04jun12-
en.pdf. 
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rules concerning second-level domains are directed toward 
ascertaining the bad faith intent of the Registry Operator.173  
Finally, ICANN also established the Trademark 
Clearinghouse. The Trademark Clearinghouse is a registry of 
trademarks submitted by trademark owners.174 Once a 
trademark is registered in the Trademark Clearinghouse, the 
trademark owner is notified if a similar top-level domain name is 
applied for.175 This allows the trademark owner to easily 
ascertain whether its trademark may be infringed.176 This 
substantially reduces trademark-policing costs.177  
 
 173 Id. § 6.2. The rules concerning a second-level domain name of a new top-level 
domain name provide that complainants are required to prove:  
by clear and convincing evidence that, through the registry operator’s 
affirmative conduct:  
(a) there is a substantial pattern or practice of specific bad faith intent by 
the registry operator to profit from the sale of trademark infringing 
domain names; and 
(b) the registry operator’s bad faith intent to profit from the systematic 
registration of domain names within the gTLD that are identical or 
confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark, which:  
 (i) takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the 
reputation of the complainant’s mark; or  
 (ii) impairs the distinctive character or the reputation of the 
complainant’s mark, or  
 (iii) creates a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s 
mark.  
 In other words, it is not sufficient to show that the registry operator is on 
notice of possible trademark infringement through registrations in the gTLD. 
The registry operator is not liable under the PDDRP solely 
because: (i) infringing names are in its registry; or (ii) the registry operator 
knows that infringing names are in its registry; or (iii) the registry operator did 
not monitor the registrations within its registry. 
 A registry operator is not liable under the PDDRP for any domain name 
registration that: (i) is registered by a person or entity that is unaffiliated with 
the registry operator; (ii) is registered without the direct or indirect 
encouragement, inducement, initiation or direction of any person or entity 
affiliated with the registry operator; and (iii) provides no direct or indirect 
benefit to the registry operator other than the typical registration fee (which 
may include other fees collected incidental to the registration process for value 
added services such enhanced [sic] registration security). 
 An example of infringement at the second level is where a registry operator 
has a pattern or practice of actively and systematically encouraging registrants 
to register second level domain names and to take unfair advantage of the 
trademark to the extent and degree that bad faith is apparent. Another 
example of infringement at the second level is where a registry operator has a 
pattern or practice of acting as the registrant or beneficial user of infringing 
registrations, to monetize and profit in bad faith. 
Id.  
 174 Trademark Clearinghouse for Rights Holders, ICANN, http://newgtlds.icann.org/ 
en/about/trademark-clearinghouse/rights-holders (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).  
 175 Id.  
 176 Id.  
 177 See id.  
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While domain name squatters were able to take advantage of 
trademark owners in the early days of the Internet, ICANN and 
Congress reacted thoughtfully in curbing the abuse of domain 
names by establishing effective policies and law.178 Indeed, 
several commentators have noted how the ACPA effectively stops 
cybersquatting.179 One exhaustive report studying the UDRP 
states that it is “a success story at least in regard of the number 
of conflicts which have been submitted for decision by UDRP 
Panels,” and that “[a]s a matter of principle, the UDRP is 
functioning satisfactorily.”180 Moreover, some commentators have 
 
 178 Moreover, ICANN was able to “discourage gTLD operators from” engaging in 
conduct to avoid the UDRP and the ACPA by making policy changes to address “domain 
name tasting.” Domain name tasting is the practice of registering a domain name for a 
short period to determine if it is profitable and, if not, then returning the domain name 
under the “‘add grace period’” for no fee. See Mark V.B. Partridge & Scott T. Lonardo, 
ICANN Can or Can It? Recent Developments in Internet Governance Involving 
Cybersquatting, Online Infringement, and Registration Practices, 1 LANDSLIDE 24, 27 
(2009) (“This new measure already has produced a dramatic reduction in domain name 
tasting. In the first month after the policy went into effect, there was an 84 percent 
decrease in the number of domain names deleted during the add grace period.”). 
 179 See, e.g., Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Domain—An Overview of the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 COMM. LAW. 3, 6 (2000) (“In the ACPA, 
practitioners now have a fine tool for protecting the rights of clients quickly and 
effectively.”); Marc Lorelli, Note, How Trademark Litigation over Internet Domain Names 
Will Change After Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 97, 127 
(2000) (“The [ACPA], though not perfect, does provide trademark owners with a stronger 
weapon in their fight against domain names that infringe on their trademark rights.”); 
Jason H. Kaplan, Comment, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Will It End 
the Reign of the Cybersquatter?, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 43, 65 (2000) (noting the “five ways” 
the “ACPA will stop cybersquatters”); Jason M. Osborn, Note, Effective and 
Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 
1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 230 (2000) (“The ACPA eliminates judge-made 
concepts of domain name trademark infringement and dilution by covering through its 
plain language the overwhelming majority of conceivable instances of cybersquatting and 
bad faith domain name registration.”); Donna L. Howard, Comment, Trademarks and 
Service Marks and Internet Domain Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
637, 655 (2001) (“[T]he ACPA specifically addresses trademarks in domain name disputes 
and provides in rem jurisdiction in some cases [and thus provides] a more efficient 
method for businesses to protect their trademarks than the traditional trademark 
laws . . . .”); Adam Silberlight, Domain Name Disputes Under the ACPA in the New 
Millennium: When Is Bad Faith Intent to Profit Really Bad Faith and Has Anything 
Changed with the ACPA’s Inception?, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 
316 (2002) (“[T]he type of behavior the ACPA sought to deter has been effectively 
controlled.”); Joseph J. Weissman, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act: Developments Through Its First Six Years, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1058, 1059–60 (2005) 
(“In the six years that have now passed since enactment of the statute, trademark owners 
have been successful in enforcing their rights against cybersquatters.”); Sondra Levine, 
The Lanham Act’s Role in the Chase After Cybersquatters, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
513, 519 (2010) (“[T]he ACPA has provided a level of protection to the victims of 
cybersquatting and cyberpiracy not previously available.”).  
 180 ANNETTE KUR, MAX-PLANCK-INST., A STUDY BY THE MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR 
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW 5, 52 (2002), 
available at http://www.zar.kit.edu/DATA/projekte/udrp_705937a.pdf. Dr. Kur also makes 
several recommendations to improve the UDRP. Id. at 52. 
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been complimentary of the UDRP.181 Notably, the lessons learned 
by ICANN led to the development of preventive policies and 
other procedures designed to further lessen the possibility of 
domain name abuse with respect to the availability of top-level 
domain names and the second-level domains that would be 
utilized in that system.182 These thoughtful actions have 
arguably led to a smooth transition for top-level domains without 
the development of additional cybersquatters or even trademark 
trolls.  
3. The Practice of Trademark Law and Third-Party 
Proceedings 
Trademark law also provides administrative procedures for 
challenging marks before they have been registered and after 
they have been federally registered on the Principal Register at 
the USPTO.183 Both of these procedures provide an opportunity 
 
 181 See, e.g., Diane L. Kilpatrick, Comment, ICANN Dispute Resolution 
vs. Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Remedies: Which Makes More “Cents” for 
the Client?, 2 HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L.J. 283, 324 (2002) (“Together, the UDRP and the ACPA 
can be a cost saving and effective way to prevent cybersquatting with the top-level domain 
(UDRP) and with the new country codes that are surfacing (ACPA).”); Edward C. 
Anderson & Timothy S. Cole, The UDRP—A Model for Dispute Resolution in 
E-Commerce?, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235, 248–49 (2002) (noting three 
“advantages” of UDRP to trademark holders: (1) “efficient[] . . . and expedient [resolution 
of] their claim”; (2) “relatively low cost”; and (3) “selection of high quality and experienced 
panelists”); John Magee, Domain Name Disputes: An Assessment of the UDRP as Against 
Traditional Litigation, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 203, 216 (2003) (“A consensus 
seems to have emerged that the operation of the UDRP continues to provide an excellent 
forum for domain name dispute resolution . . . .”); Amanda Rohrer, Note, UDRP 
Arbitration Decisions Overridden: How Sallen Undermines the System, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 563, 589 (2003) (“The UDRP has clearly established itself as a powerful tool 
to fight cybersquatting.”); Nicholas Smith & Erik Wilbers, The UDRP: Design Elements of 
an Effective ADR Mechanism, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215, 215 (2004) (“The [UDRP] has 
proven successful in providing a low-cost alternative means of resolving disputes 
involving the bad faith registration of trademarks or variations thereof as Internet 
domain names.”); Stephanie A. Gumm, UDRP: A Viable Option for Trademark Owners in 
the Fight Against Cybersquatters, in UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT 
DEVELOPMENTS FOR ONLINE CONTENT: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING NEW 
TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES, OBTAINING IP PROTECTION FOR CLIENTS, AND LITIGATING 
INTERNET INFRINGEMENT 21, 35 (Aspatore 2010). (“[I]initiating a UDRP proceeding is 
generally the most effective and efficient form of enforcement available to trademark 
owners in the war against cybersquatters.”); Emily Taylor, 5 Things ICANN Does Well, 
EMILY TAYLOR INTERNET RES. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.emilytaylor.eu/5-things-icann-
does-well/ (“ICANN’s process should be seen as the gold standard for alternative dispute 
resolution.”).   
 182 For some criticism of the system established by ICANN for gTLDs, see Marsh, 
supra note 151, at 211–21. One commentator specifically critiques ICANN’s allowance of 
“brand top level domains.” See Benjamin Boroughf, Note, The New Dot Context: How to 
Mitigate Trademark Concerns in ICANN’s New gTLD Program, 10 ISJLP 85, 86 (2014) 
(“ICANN’s new program is disastrous. When trademarks and brands appear in the top-
level domain, they lose their information conveying ability.”).  
 183 While the challenges impact the federal registrations, the party attempting to 
register may still have common law or state law trademark rights. See 3 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 73, § 20:40.  
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for third parties to ensure that their trademarks are not 
infringed or diluted by others. Notably, these procedures also 
allow trademark owners to challenge potential trademark trolls 
from asserting that they have federal trademark rights in a 
confusingly similar or dilutive mark that is owned by someone 
with a prior use date. Indeed, in the patent field, commentators 
have proposed that meaningful third-party administrative 
challenges to patents owned by patent trolls could alleviate the 
troll problem,184 and the America Invents Act185 provides for 
improved third-party challenges to patents.186 The trademark 
troll problem has been mitigated because of the presence and 
relatively widespread usage of third-party challenges in 
trademark law.  
a. Opposition Practice 
The Lanham Act provides, in part, that “[a]ny person who 
believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark 
upon the principal register . . . may . . . file an opposition in the 
Patent and Trademark Office . . . .”187 Importantly, the standing 
requirement to bring an opposition proceeding is very broad and 
includes any party with a “real commercial interest” who is not 
an “intermeddler.”188 The party challenging the attempted 
registration does not even need to own a trademark.189 This 
 
 184 See David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open 
Post-Grant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, ¶ 5, available at http://scholar 
ship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1129&context=dltr (“This iBrief proposes 
another aspect of a post-grant review that would prevent patented technology from being 
exploited by patent trolls and protect legitimate patent holders.”); Joseph Farrell 
& Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t 
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 964–68 (2004) (discussing problems with pre-AIA post-grant 
proceedings and recommending changes to system); Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant 
Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 103, 116 (2011) (noting that a post-grant opposition system “offers a quick and cheap 
alternative to litigation and solves the problems that have plagued reexamination”).  
 185 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 186 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29 (2012); see also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN 
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1046–68 (6th ed. 
2013) (discussing “five new types of PTO procedures involving patents”).  
 187 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2012). Notably, patent commentators tend to argue against 
pre-grant opposition proceedings in the patent field. See Carrier, supra note 184, at 
115−16 (“First, it would require early disclosure of patent applications, which could 
provide secret information to competitors. Second, large firms are more likely to use 
pre-grant opposition to delay the issuance of patents to small inventors.”).  
 188 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 73, § 20:7. 
 189 See generally id.; TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 
(TBMP) § 309.03(b) (2014) [hereinafter TBMP] (“A plaintiff need not assert proprietary 
rights in a term in order to have standing.”). Indeed, “[t]here is no requirement that a 
plaintiff show a personal interest in the proceeding different from or ‘beyond that of the 
general public’ in order to establish standing.” Id. § 303.03 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 
F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).  
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broad standing requirement allows mark owners to challenge 
attempted registrations and ensure that spurious mark owners 
do not obtain federal registration. The grounds for challenging a 
mark include any of the Lanham Act section 2 grounds for 
contesting registration of a mark as well as dilution by 
tarnishment and blurring.190 The section 2 grounds include 
challenging marks for a likelihood of confusion with a 
pre-existing mark.191 The ability to challenge a mark based on a 
likelihood of confusion and for dilution grounds enables the 
trademark holder to prevent potential trolls from establishing 
federal trademark rights in the first instance and creating 
harmful confusion or dilution.  
 
 190 See id. § 309.03(c) (“A plaintiff may raise any available statutory ground for 
opposition or cancellation that negates the defendant’s right to registration.”). The section 
2 grounds for challenging the registration of a mark on the Principal Register include:  
 (a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or 
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, 
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into 
contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used on or in 
connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the 
goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the 
applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO 
Agreement . . . enters into force with respect to the United States. 
 (b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the 
United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any 
simulation thereof. 
 (c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a 
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, 
signature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the 
life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow. 
 (d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in 
the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on 
or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive . . . . 
 (e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods 
of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, 
(2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily 
geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may 
be registrable under section 1054 of this title, (3) when used on or in connection 
with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive of them, (4) is primarily merely a surname, or (5) comprises any 
matter that, as a whole, is functional. 
 (f) Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5) 
of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark 
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in 
commerce. 
15 U.S.C. § 1052. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure lists 
twenty-three potential grounds for opposing or canceling a mark. TBMP, supra note 189, 
§ 309.03(c).  
 191 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Moreover, the rules concerning oppositions allow an opposer 
to challenge a mark for likelihood of confusion based on a trade name or “analogous use” 
of a mark. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 73, § 20:16.  
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The timing to file an opposition is keyed to the publication of 
the mark in the Trademark Official Gazette.192 After a trademark 
attorney determines that a mark should be registered, it is 
published in the Trademark Official Gazette.193 The Trademark 
Official Gazette is a weekly electronic publication of the USPTO 
and “contains bibliographic information and a representative 
drawing for each mark published, along with a list of cancelled 
and renewed registrations.”194 Interested third parties have 
thirty days, which can be extended, to file an opposition to a 
mark published in the Trademark Official Gazette.195 Trademark 
owners may review the Trademark Official Gazette for 
potentially infringing or diluting marks. This provides the 
necessary information for a trademark owner to assess whether 
they need to challenge an applied-for mark before it is registered. 
There is also a Patent Official Gazette.196  
b. Cancellation Practice 
Trademark law provides the opportunity for trademark 
owners to challenge registered marks on a number of grounds 
through a cancellation proceeding.197 Similar to the rules 
concerning oppositions, a party bringing a cancellation action 
benefits from broad standing requirements198 and robust grounds 
 
 192 TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1502 (Jan. 2015) 
[hereinafter TMEP], available at http://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/detail/manual/TMEP/ 
current/d1e2.xml#/manual /TMEP/current/TMEP-1500d1e1.xml. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Trademark Official Gazette (TMOG), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.us 
pto.gov/news/og/ trademark_og/index.jsp (last modified Apr. 7, 2015). The TMOG includes 
the following information:  
The TMOG contains a depiction of the mark, the identification of goods and/or 
services, and owner information for: (1) marks published for opposition that are 
expected to register on the Principal Register; (2) marks registered on the 
Principal Register under 15 U.S.C. §1051(d) on the date of the particular 
TMOG issue in which the marks appear; (3) marks registered on the 
Supplemental Register on the date of the particular TMOG issue in which the 
marks appear; and (4) updated registration certificates. The TMOG also 
contains a list, by International Class, of the registrations issued on the 
Principal Register on the date of the particular TMOG issue and an index of 
registrants appearing in that issue.  
General Frequently Asked Questions About the Trademark Official Gazette (TMOG), 
USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/tm_og_faqs.jsp (last modified Dec. 
5, 2013).  
 195 TMEP, supra note 192.  
 196 Official Gazette for Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ 
news/og/patent_og/ index.jsp (last modified Apr. 7, 2015). 
 197 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). One commentator argues that district courts should 
utilize cancellation procedures based on a lack of use to deter trademark trolls and 
prevent trademark thickets, including a cluttered register. Folgers, supra note 23, at 
479−84. District courts also have the power to invalidate patents. See Blonder Tongue 
Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
 198 See generally TBMP, supra note 189, §§ 303.01–03.  
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for challenging a registration.199 One important difference 
between cancellations and oppositions is that a mark registered 
for five years is only subject to cancellation on a limited number 
of grounds.200 However, the Lanham Act does allow challenges 
“[a]t any time” based on “the registered mark . . . being used by, 
or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent 
the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which 
the mark is used.”201 This provision allows trademark owners 
another opportunity to prevent other parties from infringing 
their marks.  
Section 1064 of Title 15 also empowers the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to bring cancellation actions against 
registered marks on specific grounds, such as functionality and 
misrepresentation of the source of goods or services.202 If a 
trademark troll problem were to develop, the FTC could bring an 
action to cancel a mark that was used improperly.  
c. Abuse of Cancellation or Opposition Proceedings 
There is the possibility of abuse of a cancellation or 
opposition proceeding.203 For example, a supposed trademark 
troll could use cancellation or opposition proceedings to interfere 
with a bona fide trademark owner’s ability to obtain a federal 
registration because of the generous standing requirement. The 
danger of this occurring is mitigated for at least two reasons. 
First, the use requirement still exists. For example, analogous 
use can be used to predate another party’s actual use date, but 
that analogous use must be perfected. Thus, the opposer, or 
canceler, must have used the trademark, and therefore would 
arguably not fit the definition of a troll. Second, trademark law 
allows the party against whom the opposition or cancellation is 
filed to raise a counterclaim essentially attacking the other 
party’s prior registration, if it has been raised.204 This puts the 
purported trademark owner’s mark at issue. 
 
 199 Id. § 309.03(c).  
 200 Id.  
 201 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).  
 202 Id. 
 203 Notably, LegalForce Trademarkia collects and publishes data about oppositions 
filed by supposed “trademark bullies.” See Find a Trademark Bully, LEGALFORCE 
TRADEMARKIA, http://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/opposition-brand.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2014). “Trademark bully” is apparently defined as anyone who opposes a 
trademark. See id. 
 204 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 73, at §§ 20:22, 20:66.  
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4. Supreme Court Precedent Primarily Addressed to Patent 
Trolls 
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several opinions that 
were, in part, directed to the patent troll problem. These opinions 
have, at least, signaled to district courts and appellate courts to 
be sensitive to potential litigation abuse involving intellectual 
property claims.205 One of the opinions concerns the standard for 
obtaining permanent relief.206 The second case concerns the 
availability of attorney fees.  
a. eBay v. MercExchange 
The 2006 eBay v. MercExchange case concerned injunctive 
relief and patent law.207 MercExchange apparently fit the general 
definition of a patent troll. MercExchange did not practice the 
invention, but was attempting to extract licensing fees from a 
company that was using the invention.208 MercExchange’s patent 
essentially covered an online auction.209 
In that case, the jury found that MercExchange’s patent was 
valid and infringed.210 The jury further awarded damages, but 
the district court did not award injunctive relief.211 In applying 
the test for permanent injunctive relief, the district court 
determined that MercExchange failed to prove that there was an 
inadequate remedy at law and irreparable harm.212 The district 
court reasoned that MercExchange was willing to license its 
patented technology and thus would accept money in exchange 
for permission to use its license.213 The Federal Circuit decided 
that the district court abused its discretion.214 The Federal 
Circuit applied its rule that states that if a patent is valid and 
infringed, then an injunction must issue absent exceptional 
 
 205 One U.S. Supreme Court case concerning trademark law could actually help 
patent trolls. In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court 
allowed a supposed trademark bully, Nike, to moot a trademark counterclaim challenging 
a Nike mark by filing a “Covenant Not to Sue.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 
725, 733 (2013). 
 206 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).  
 207 For additional discussion concerning the eBay case, see generally Jones, supra 
note 24. 
 208 See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of 
Petitioners at 7, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) 
(“Patent owners who do not manufacture the patented or any other competing good, and 
who seek only to license their invention at a reasonable royalty, should be entitled to 
injunctive relief only if they would be irreparably injured by the infringement.”).  
 209 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390. 
 210 Id. at 390–91.  
 211 Id. at 391.  
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 393.  
 214 Id. 
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circumstances.215 The Supreme Court rejected the Federal 
Circuit rule and the specific reasoning of the district court.216 
Notably, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts deciding 
whether to grant injunctive relief must apply the traditional 
four-factor test:  
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.217 
The Supreme Court further rejected the notion that there 
should be any broad classification of cases that should be entitled 
to or denied injunctive relief.218 The Supreme Court not only 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule, but also the reasoning of the 
district court “that a ‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ 
and ‘its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents’ 
would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not 
suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.”219 
Notably, in rejecting the district court’s analysis, the Supreme 
Court noted that universities may fit the definition of the district 
court, but may be entitled to an injunction.220 The Supreme Court 
determined that adopting either the Federal Circuit’s or district 
court’s classification would be contrary to traditional equitable 
principles and case law.221 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy wrote separate 
concurrences. Chief Justice Roberts observed that the majority 
correctly noted the applicable law, but that the traditional 
four-factor test should be applied in light of its historical 
application.222 Justice Kennedy agreed with both the majority 
and Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence, but attempted to clarify 
that the current patent troll situation is relatively new and not 
something that occurred often in the past. Justice Kennedy 
explained:  
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many 
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic 
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike 
earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents 
 
 215 Id. at 393–94.  
 216 Id. at 394.  
 217 Id. at 391. 
 218 Id. at 394.  
 219 Id. at 393. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
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not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily 
for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented 
invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek 
to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for 
undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient 
to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve 
the public interest. In addition injunctive relief may have different 
consequences for the burgeoning number of patents over business 
methods, which were not of much economic and legal significance in 
earlier times. The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of 
these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.223 
Justice Kennedy concluded by noting that equitable discretion 
allows courts to appropriately consider “the rapid technological 
and legal developments in the patent system.”224 
The eBay v. MercExchange case was a setback for patent 
trolls because it lessened their ability to obtain a permanent 
injunction, which substantially reduced their leverage in 
settlement negotiations.225 The eBay v. MercExchange case has 
not only influenced the issuance of injunctions under copyright226 
and patent law, but also has impacted trademark law as well. 
For example, in the 2012 Seed Services v. Windsor Grain 
decision, the district court noted that after eBay v. MercExhange 
and other decisions, the law is “in flux” concerning the 
applicability of categorical rules concerning injunctions.227 A 
common categorical rule in trademark law is that once a 
likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement 
 
 223 Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 224 Id. at 397. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court also issued the Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council decision. The Winter case addressed preliminary injunctions 
and essentially requires district courts to apply all of the traditional equitable factors for 
determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue and rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” standard. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20–22 (2008).  
 225 See Jones, supra note 24, at 1059 (“Applying the traditional four-factor test, as 
required by eBay, [two] courts denied injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, who were arguably 
NPEs.”); Golden, supra note 1, at 2113 (“Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
eBay, district courts appear to have consistently denied permanent injunctions in cases 
where an infringer has contested the patent holder’s request for such relief and the 
infringer and patent holder were not competitors.”). But see Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick 
M. Arenz, Non-Practicing Entities and Permanent Injunctions Post-eBay, 12 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 203, 205 (2011) (noting that several district courts have granted injunctions to 
non-practicing entities).  
 226 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In 
sum, we conclude that our longstanding rule that ‘[a] showing of a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits in a copyright infringement claim raises a presumption of 
irreparable harm, is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning’ of the Court’s decision in 
eBay and has therefore been ‘effectively overruled.’”) (citations omitted). 
 227 Seed Servs., Inc. v. Winsor Grain, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2012).  
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claim is proved, then there is a presumption of irreparable 
harm.228 The district court expressly refused to apply the 
presumption post-eBay and noted that, “[g]iven the overall trend 
of the case law, the court will not assume the existence of 
irreparable injury due to a showing of success on the merits.”229 
Numerous other district court cases have questioned or refused 
to apply the presumption of irreparable harm rule in trademark 
cases.230 Notably, the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit have 
held that the presumption of irreparable harm does not apply to 
Lanham Act cases.231 
b. Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness 
A high standard for obtaining attorney fees could embolden 
patent owners to bring patent suits or threaten suits even if the 
grounds for those suits are not very strong. Thus, a lower 
standard for granting attorney fees could deter patent trolls and 
also trademark trolls from bringing or threatening an 
infringement action. In Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness 
and a companion case, Highmark v. Allcare Health Management 
System,232 the Supreme Court confronted the Federal Circuit’s 
 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 1005. Courts dealing with trademark issues have found irreparable harm 
given evidence of the loss of control over the goodwill of the trademark. Id.  
 230 See Jumbo Bright Trading Ltd. v. Gap, Inc., No. CV 12–08932 DDP (MANx), 2012 
WL 5289784, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (collecting cases questioning or refusing to 
apply presumption of irreparable harm to trademark cases); Spiraledge, Inc. v. SeaWorld 
Entm’t, Inc., No. 13cv296–WQH–BLM, 2013 WL 3467435, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) 
(discussing cases refusing to apply presumption to trademark cases).  
 231 See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Because a presumption of irreparable harm deviates from the traditional principles of 
equity, which require a movant to demonstrate irreparable harm, we hold that there is no 
presumption of irreparable harm afforded to parties seeking injunctive relief in Lanham 
Act cases.”); Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th 
Cir. 2013). For an argument that eBay should not apply to trademark law’s presumption 
of irreparable harm, see Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 73, at 1038 (concluding “that 
eBay should not be used to eviscerate the normal presumption of irreparable harm that 
attaches upon a showing of liability in trademark cases”); J. Thomas McCarthy, Are 
Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 3–5 (2009); Jeffrey M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed 
Presumption? Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive 
eBay and Winter, 2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 538 (2011) (arguing that presumption of 
irreparable harm should still apply to trademark law post-eBay). For a review of cases 
and argument that a presumption of irreparable harm should not apply post-eBay to 
trademark, patent, and copyright, see Aurelia Hepburn-Briscoe, Irreparable Harm in 
Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Cases After eBay v. MercExchange, 55 HOW. L.J. 643, 
660–76 (2012); see also Sandra Rierson, IP Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on 
Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163, 176−77 (2008) (“[I]n trademark as well as 
patent cases, eBay’s mandate to avoid formulaic approaches to the assessment of 
injunctive relief should eliminate the presumption that a trademark holder has, as a 
matter of law, proven irreparable injury merely by showing a likelihood of confusion 
sufficient to demonstrate trademark infringement.”).  
 232 See generally Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 
(2014).  
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standards for granting attorney fees in patent infringement 
cases.233 The Federal Circuit set a relatively high bar for 
obtaining attorney fees and the Supreme Court rejected that 
standard.234 In describing the Federal Circuit’s standard, the 
Supreme Court stated:  
In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 
(2005), the court held that a case is “exceptional” under § 285 only 
“when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to 
the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or 
inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during 
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions. Absent misconduct in conduct of 
the litigation or in securing the patent,” the Federal Circuit continued, 
fees “may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the 
litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is 
objectively baseless.” The Federal Circuit subsequently clarified that 
litigation is objectively baseless only if it is “so unreasonable that no 
reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed,” iLOR, LLC 
v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378 (2011), and that litigation is 
brought in subjective bad faith only if the plaintiff “actually know[s]” 
that it is objectively baseless. 
Finally, Brooks Furniture held that because “[t]here is a presumption 
that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in 
good faith[,] . . . the underlying improper conduct and the 
characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence.”235  
The Supreme Court determined that the language under the 
Patent Act allowing district courts discretion to grant attorney 
fees in an “‘exceptional’ case” was not as restrictive as the 
interpretation provided by the Federal Circuit.236 The Supreme 
Court explained that “exceptional cases” means unusual or rare 
cases and held that, “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that 
stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength 
of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing 
law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in 
which the case was litigated.”237 The Federal Circuit’s standards 
were too restrictive and essentially not consistent with the 
ordinary meaning of “exceptional.”238 The Supreme Court further 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that exceptional cases must be 
 
 233 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1752–53 
(2014). Notably, ICON Health & Fitness does not fit the standard definition of a patent 
troll. While ICON Health & Fitness did not practice the invention in the patent, it did 
manufacture exercise equipment. Id. at 1754–55.  
 234 Id. at 1755–56.  
 235 Id. at 1754 (citations omitted).  
 236 Id. at 1756.  
 237 Id.  
 238 Id. 
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proved by clear and convincing evidence.239 The Supreme Court 
made it easier for district courts to award attorney fees and, 
thus, may have deterred some patent trolls from bringing suit.  
At least one circuit court of appeals has already applied 
Octane Fitness to a trademark case even though the Octane 
Fitness decision was issued in April of 2014. The Third Circuit, in 
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, stated that Octane Fitness 
applies to claims for attorney fees in trade dress cases under 
section 35(a) of the Lanham Act.240 Notably, the Third Circuit 
explained that its prior, more restrictive test for awarding 
attorney fees under the Lanham Act did not apply:  
Importantly, that discretion is not cabined by a threshold requirement 
that the losing party acted culpably. The losing party’s 
blameworthiness may well play a role in a district court’s analysis of 
the “exceptionality” of a case, but Octane Fitness has eliminated the 
first step in our two-step test for awarding fees under § 35(a) of the 
Lanham Act.241 
Thus, in circuits with more restrictive tests, the Octane 
Fitness standard may make attorney fees more available to 
alleged infringers in trademark cases. The lesser burden to 
receive attorney fees may serve to deter trademark trolls from 
bringing or threatening suit.242  
5. Litigation and Strategic Advantages Associated with 
Patent Trolls 
The business of patent trolling works because of several 
litigation and strategic advantages available to patent trolls. Five 
of those advantages are relevant to this discussion. The 
advantages are “layering” alleged infringers, unavailability of 
litigation counterclaims, asymmetrical discovery, availability of 
forum shopping, and the opportunity to engage in holdups.  
First, patent trolls are able to assert their patents against 
multiple accused infringers and take advantage of the ability to 
 
 239 Id. at 1758.  
 240 Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 241 Id. at 315. For a discussion of the various standards for awarding attorney fees 
under the Lanham Act, see generally Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc., v. Anodyne 
Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 242 But see Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., No. 3:10cv1827 (JBA), 2014 WL 
4073204, *4–5 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2014) (refusing to apply Octane Fitness to a trademark 
case and continuing to apply the more restrictive Second Circuit test for determining 
whether attorney fees may be awarded in trademark cases). For additional discussion, see 
Bill Donahue, Octane Fitness Applies to Trademark Cases, 3rd Circ. Rules, LAW360 (Sept. 
4, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/574089/octane-fitness-applies-to-trade 
mark-cases-3rd-circ-rules. Prior to Octane Fitness, one commentator endorsed the 
granting of attorney fees and costs against a supposed trademark troll as a way to deter 
troll conduct. See Folgers, supra note 23, at 485.  
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“layer” defendants strategically.243 For example, a patent troll 
may file the initial suit against a smaller entity that does not 
have a lot of sales. The smaller entity may accept a settlement 
with a high royalty rate because of its low amount of sales.244 The 
patent troll will then file suit against larger entities with more 
sales and assert the higher royalty rate in assessing a reasonable 
royalty rate in damages.245 Moreover, the patent troll may assert 
actions against a smaller group of potential infringers with the 
hope that extracted licensing fees will fund future litigation 
against large entities.246 This advantage does not exist for 
trademark trolls—at least not to the same extent. The trademark 
troll will ordinarily only have one or a small group of potential 
infringers or diluters to extract payments from with its 
trademark. The trademark should only be asserted against 
confusingly similar or dilutive marks. There is a danger that the 
trademark may be famous and subject to dilution protection; 
however, the trademark troll’s trademark must also be 
“famous.”247 In order to be famous, the mark would have been 
well-known to the “general consuming public”248 and it is unlikely 
a troll would be able to surprise an existing trademark holder 
with a famous mark.  
Second, patent trolls are usually not subject to counterclaims 
for infringement because they are not practicing their patented 
invention or any other invention.249 In trademark law, in order 
for the trademark troll to have trademark rights, it generally 
must be using the mark. Since the supposed trademark troll is 
using the mark, any trademark troll is also potentially subject to 
a counterclaim for infringement by the alleged infringer.  
 
 243 See Liu, supra note 25, at 511 (“NPEs . . . may still target small businesses to 
validate their patents and drive up the royalty rate of licenses in order to pursue larger 
companies. This strategy, sometimes known as ‘royalty padding,’ involves suing small 
defendants first and settling the lawsuits through licenses that carry low dollar amounts 
but represent high royalty rates. Subsequently, the NPE will target a large company and 
introduce the previous royalty rate as evidence to drive up the damage award.”).  
 244 Id. at 499 (“[L]icense terms for a patent can be used in subsequent litigation to 
establish a reasonable royalty rate for damage calculations. As a result, NPEs may also 
target small companies to strengthen their position in future infringement claims by 
establishing a favorable royalty rate for their patents.”).  
 245 Id.  
 246 John Ansbach & Deepali Brahmbhatt, Tips on Handling the Patent Troll in Court 
When Multiple Related Cases Are Involved, ACC DOCKET, Mar. 2014, at 58, 62.  
 247 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012).  
 248 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 249 See Adam D. Kline, Any Given Forum: A Proposed Solution to the Inequitable 
Economic Advantage that Arises When Non-Practicing Patent Holding Organizations 
Predetermine Forum, 48 IDEA 247, 255 (2008) (“[A] patent holding organization does not 
infringe any patents and is not subject to an infringement counterclaim.”); Rantanen, 
supra note 24, at 169 (“[T]he most dangerous type of patent troll is a troll without any 
product line at all—in other words, a firm against whom it is impossible to assert patents 
as a defense.”).  
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Third, patent trolls have usually purchased the patents that 
they assert, perhaps in bankruptcy, and have little connection 
with the inventor or the inventing process.250 Moreover, the 
patent troll is not practicing the invention. This means that the 
troll usually does not have many documents to discover and 
personnel to depose, and thus the discovery expenses are much 
lower for the troll.251 The alleged infringer still has to incur the 
costs of full discovery. This provides an incentive for the troll to 
bring the litigation and for the accused infringer to settle and 
avoid costly discovery.252 This similarly could be a problem with 
respect to a trademark troll. A trademark troll may have 
acquired a trademark from a distressed entity and is claiming a 
use date from the prior owner.253 However, the trademark troll 
must use the trademark to have some rights, and thus there may 
be more discovery that could be found against that particular 
troll.  
Fourth, patent trolls strategically choose forums that provide 
some perceived advantage, such as the Eastern District of Texas, 
where large jury awards, particularly against foreign infringers, 
are common.254 A patent troll will often form an entity in the 
district in which it wishes to bring an action255 and the alleged 
infringer, who practices the invention, may have contacts in most 
jurisdictions. It is not clear whether there are particular districts 
that are more favorable to trademark owners over trademark 
infringers with respect to damage awards.  
 
 250 See Ansbach & Brahmbhatt, supra note 246, at 62–63.  
 251 Id. at 62.  
 252 Id. at 63. 
 253 A trademark troll would likely have to wait quite a long time, perhaps abandoning 
its mark, in order to surprise a subsequent trademark owner who invests in a confusingly 
similar trademark.  
 254 Kline, supra note 249, at 247 (“File a patent infringement suit in Marshall, Texas, 
and your chances of winning at trial average eighty-eight percent; file in New York, and 
your chances are cut to less than half. The spoils of victory are greater in Marshall, as 
well, where juries are known for handing out ‘Texas-sized’ awards.”). The America 
Invents Act includes several provisions that arguably address patent trolls, such as a 
provision that limits which accused infringers a patentee may join to a suit. See Tracie L. 
Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
687, 688 (2012) (“This note argues that one of the purposes of the AIA, including the 
joinder provision, is to address the problem of ‘patent trolls.’”). According to Ms. Bryant, 
the joining of “large numbers of unrelated, geographically diverse defendants . . . has at 
least two benefits[: (1)] . . . joining multiple defendants reduces litigation costs[; and 
(2)] . . . the presence of multiple defendants makes it more difficult to transfer the case to 
a more convenient forum.” Id. at 688–89. Moreover, the removal of the opportunity to join 
unrelated parties makes it more likely that the NPE must face multiple challenges to the 
validity of the asserted patents. See Liu, supra note 25, at 502 (“By consolidating its cases, 
the NPE reduces the number of times that a court will examine the patent’s validity, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that its patent will be declared invalid [and lessening the 
chances of collateral estoppel applying].”).  
 255 See Ansbach & Brahmbhatt, supra note 246, at 63.  
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Finally, trademark law considers the intent of the alleged 
infringer in determining liability for infringement and blurring 
type dilution,256 although it is one factor amongst several factors 
used to determine a likelihood of confusion or blurring type 
dilution.257 Patent law does not consider intent in assessing 
direct patent infringement.258 Thus, a trademark troll is less 
likely to be able to surprise and hold up an alleged infringer or 
diluter, unlike a patent troll.259 The court will, at least, consider 
the intention of the alleged infringer or diluter.  
6. Consumer Protection to Combat Patent Trolls 
Another event that could stifle the development of 
trademark trolls is the possibility that state attorneys general 
will also sue trademark trolls for sending abusive 
cease-and-desist letters, as has happened with patent trolls.260 
Moreover, the FTC recently entered a settlement agreement with 
a patent troll. The possibility that the FTC may bring an action 
against trademark trolls may lessen the likelihood that a 
problem with trademark trolls will develop.  
The Vermont, Nebraska, and Minnesota Attorneys General 
have brought suit against patent trolls for the abusive efforts of 
patent trolls.261 Moreover, the Vermont Legislature passed a law 
that is specifically targeted at patent trolls.262 The law prohibits 
“bad faith assertions” of patents.263 The determination of what is 
bad faith depends on an analysis of various factors, including a 
failure to include specific information such as specific factual 
allegations concerning infringement, a failure “to conduct an 
analysis comparing claims,” whether the claim is meritless or 
 
 256 Magliocca, supra note 1, at 1815 (“[T]he risk presented by these surprise suits is 
high because patent law holds a defendant liable for infringement even if it does not know 
that an item is patented. While trademark law considers the intent of an alleged infringer 
and gives an innocent user the benefit of the doubt, patent law does not.”).  
 257 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing 
factors to consider in determining a likelihood of confusion); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v) 
(2012).  
 258 See Magliocca, supra note 1, at 1815.  
 259 Id.  
 260 For additional discussion of state legislation concerning patent trolls, other 
consumer protection efforts, and proposals to combat abusive cease-and-desist letters, see 
Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. 33–53 
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=25 
15455.  
 261 See David Balto, Vermont Comes After the Trolls, U.S. NEWS (May 31, 2013, 6:15 
PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/05/31/vermont-was 
tes-no-time-targeting-patent-trolls; Pamela M. Prah, State AGs Target Patent Trolls to 
Protect Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2013/11/25/state-ag-patent-trolls/3696889/.  
 262 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–99 (2014). 
 263 Id. § 4197(a).  
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deceptive, and whether the entity asserting the patent has been 
successful in prior litigation.264 Section 4199 of the legislation 
 
 264 Id. § 4197. Section 4197 provides in relevant part:  
 (a) A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement. 
 (b) A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has 
made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement: 
 (1) The demand letter does not contain the following information: 
 (A) the patent number; 
 (B) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and 
assignee or assignees, if any; and 
 (C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the 
target’s products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are 
covered by the claims in the patent. 
 (2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an 
analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s products, 
services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not 
identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are 
covered by the claims in the patent. 
 (3) The demand letter lacks the information described in subdivision (1) 
of this subsection, the target requests the information, and the person 
fails to provide the information within a reasonable period of time. 
 (4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response 
within an unreasonably short period of time. 
 (5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that is not 
based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license. 
 (6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the 
person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is 
meritless. 
 (7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive. 
 (8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously filed or 
threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim 
of patent infringement, and: 
 (A) those threats or lawsuits lacked the information described in 
subdivision (1) of this subsection; or 
 (B) the person attempted to enforce the claim of patent 
infringement in litigation and a court found the claim to be 
meritless. 
 (9) Any other factor the court finds relevant. 
 (c) A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has 
not made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement: 
 (1) The demand letter contains the information described in subdivision 
(b)(1) of this section. 
 (2) Where the demand letter lacks the information described in 
subdivision (b)(1) of this section and the target requests the information, 
the person provides the information within a reasonable period of time. 
 (3) The person engages in a good faith effort to establish that the target 
has infringed the patent and to negotiate an appropriate remedy. 
 (4) The person makes a substantial investment in the use of the patent 
or in the production or sale of a product or item covered by the patent. 
 (5) The person is: 
 (A) the inventor or joint inventor of the patent or, in the case of a 
patent filed by and awarded to an assignee of the original inventor 
or joint inventor, is the original assignee; or 
 (B) an institution of higher education or a technology transfer 
organization owned or affiliated with an institution of higher 
education. 
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provides for attorney fees, costs, and “exemplary damages in an 
amount equal to $50,000.00 or three times the total of damages, 
costs, and fees, whichever is greater.”265 Vermont has brought at 
least one suit against a well-known patent troll under its general 
consumer protection laws.266  
Recently, the FTC reached a settlement agreement with a 
well-known patent troll.267 Notably, future deceptive conduct will 
result in relatively substantial fines.268 The use of consumer 
protection laws, as well as tailored laws, may deter trademark 
trolls and will certainly influence the behavior of potential 
trolls.269  
7. The Federal Circuit and Uniformity as the Root of Trolls 
At least one commentator has argued that the Federal 
Circuit and its case law are essentially responsible for the patent 
troll problem.270 Other commentators have criticized the Federal 
Circuit for its supposedly pro-patent approach and argued that 
the Federal Circuit should share jurisdiction over patent appeals 
with the other regional circuits.271 Thus, the Federal Circuit’s 
 
 (6) The person has: 
 (A) demonstrated good faith business practices in previous efforts to 
enforce the patent, or a substantially similar patent; or 
 (B) successfully enforced the patent, or a substantially similar 
patent, through litigation. 
 (7) Any other factor the court finds relevant. 
Id. 
 265 Id. § 4199.  
 266 See Goldman, Vermont, supra note 127.  
 267 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion 
Entity From Using Abusive Deceptive Tactics (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-
deceptive; see also Michael S. Mireles, U.S. Federal Trade Commission and NPE Enter 
Settlement Agreement, IP FIN. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:21 PM), http://ipfinance.blogspot. 
com/2014/11/us-federal-trade-commission-and-npe.html.  
 268 See Mireles, supra note 267. 
 269 The state of Minnesota considered adopting legislation directed at trademark 
bullies. See Steve Baird, Minnesota to Own “Trademark Bullies,” DUETSBLOG (Mar. 18, 
2013), http://www.duetsblog.com/2013/03/articles/trademarks/minnesotas-latest-answer-
to-the-trademark-bullying-problem/. For the Minnesota House version of the bill, see H.R. 
1116, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess. (Minn. 2013), available at http://www.duetsblog.com/files/ 
2013/03/MNTMBullying.pdf.  
 270 See Dourado, supra note 34; see also Jones, supra note 24, at 1040 (“As the 
property rights of patents became stronger due in part to uniform application of the law 
under the Federal Circuit, the licensing and enforcing of patents became more 
lucrative.”).  
 271 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principal, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (“We propose that, in addition to the 
Federal Circuit, at least one extant circuit court should be allowed to hear district court 
appeals relating to patent law. In addition, both the Federal Circuit and United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) should have 
jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO . . . .”); Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the 
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influence over patent law would be reduced, and the Supreme 
Court would benefit from having other viewpoints concerning 
patent law from the circuit courts of appeal.272 Notably, the 
Supreme Court has heard a number of appeals from the Federal 
Circuit concerning patent law and has overturned the Federal 
Circuit numerous times.273 Some of the potential downsides to 
removing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
appeals would include having a less uniform nationwide patent 
law274 and the existence of extensive forum shopping. To the 
extent that the Federal Circuit is responsible for the patent troll 
phenomena, trademark law should be less susceptible to the 
development of the same problem because the Federal Circuit 
shares jurisdiction over trademark appeals275 with the other 
federal circuit courts of appeal.276 Thus, the problems associated 
with capture by an interested group277—such as trademark 
lawyers—are less likely and the Supreme Court is able to get 
various views from the other circuit courts of appeal concerning 
trademark issues. Moreover, state courts hear trademark cases 
as well. Notably, many argue that trademark law has continued 
to expand; however, some circuit courts of appeal have applied 
doctrines such as nominative fair use and other doctrines to 
protect competition and First Amendment values.278 Thus, the 
nature and structure of the appellate system and development of 
trademark law could make it less likely that a trademark troll 
problem could develop similar to the patent troll situation.  
8. Early Case Law Dealing Harshly with a Trademark Troll 
One Seventh Circuit case dealt relatively harshly with a 
supposed trademark troll. In 2007, the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
district court’s decision which canceled a purported trademark 
troll’s “Stealth” mark and awarded attorney fees and costs.279 In 
that case, the alleged trademark owner, Stoller, was notorious for 
his litigious conduct, and the Northern District of Illinois 
“enjoined him or any of his companies from filing any new civil 
 
Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 
(2013).  
 272 Wood, supra note 271, at 10.  
 273 See, e.g., Amy Miller, Comment: Supreme Court Reins in Federal Circuit Decisions 
Favoring Patent Holders, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Aug. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2014/08/MLex_Content.pdf.  
 274 See Wood, supra note 271, at 2.  
 275 The Federal Circuit hears appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  
 276 I plan to explore this idea in a future paper.  
 277 See Dourado, supra note 34.  
 278 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
 279 Cent. Mfg., Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). For a detailed 
discussion of this case, see Folgers, supra note 23.  
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action in the district’s courts without first obtaining the court’s 
permission.”280 Despite evidence that Stoller may have actually 
used the mark in connection with similar goods, the district court 
rejected that evidence to support a registration and an earlier 
use date than the alleged infringer’s.281 The Seventh Circuit 
found that the district court did not err and stated:  
Even if the sufficiency of [Stoller]’s use were not a question of fact 
warranting deferential treatment on appellate review, it would not be 
a close question: there is absolutely nothing in the record upon which 
any reasonable person could conclude that [Stoller] and its 
predecessors actually sold “Stealth” baseballs prior to Brett Brothers 
[sic] first use of the mark in 1999. Stoller has repeatedly sought ways 
to get around trademark law’s prohibition on the stockpiling of unused 
marks, and this case is no different. It is unfathomable that a 
company claiming to have engaged in thousands of dollars of sales of a 
product for more than a decade would be unable to produce even a 
single purchase order or invoice as proof. Self-serving deposition 
testimony is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. By 
exposing [Stoller]’s failure to make bona fide use of the “Stealth” mark 
for baseballs, Brett Brothers met its burden to overcome the 
presumption afforded by the 1985 registration, and summary 
judgment in its favor was the appropriate course.282 
The Seventh Circuit also approved the district court’s 
cancellation of Stoller’s mark and grant of attorney fees and 
costs. In upholding the award of fees and costs, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that the standard was essentially whether the 
litigation was “oppressive.” The Seventh Circuit noted that:  
It filed an infringement lawsuit without evidence of any sales of 
baseballs or baseball bats to support its claim to rights in the 
“Stealth” mark for such products. It ignored requests to produce 
documents to support its claim, forcing the defendants’ lawyers to go 
to court to compel action. Stoller offered confused, misleading 
deposition testimony with unfulfilled promises of cooperation. And the 
documents eventually produced effectively made a mockery of the 
entire proceeding.283 
Soon after the issuance of the opinion, a commentator argued 
that the Seventh Circuit’s handling of Mr. Stoller may deter 
trademark trolls.284 The commentator may be correct given the 
relatively few reports concerning trademark trolls since the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision. However, trademark-bullying 
 
 280 Brett, 492 F.3d at 881. Notably, Stoller also claimed he owned the “Google” mark. 
See Google, Inc. v. Cent. Mfg., Inc., 316 F. App’x 491, 492 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 281 Brett, 492 F.3d at 882.  
 282 Id. at 883 (citations omitted).  
 283 Id. at 884. 
 284 See generally Folgers, supra note 23.  
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behavior has apparently continued to some extent—likely for the 
reasons discussed.  
CONCLUSION 
There are enforcement issues with trademark law and 
practice. However, trademark law and practice do not suffer from 
a troll problem for the reasons explained. Those reasons 
include: the trademark use requirement, Congress’ and ICANN’s 
response and careful planning to address issues concerning 
domain names, the availability and widespread use of opposition 
and cancellation proceedings at the USPTO, Supreme Court 
precedent addressed to patent trolls applied in trademark cases, 
litigation and strategic advantages available to patent trolls not 
present in trademark cases, enforcement of consumer protection 
laws against patent trolls, shared appellate jurisdiction over 
trademark cases, and an early appellate case dealing harshly 
with a trademark troll. If the use requirement and the 
prohibitions on naked licensing and assignments in gross are 
discarded or weakened, a trademark troll problem could develop 
in the United States similar to that in other countries. The 
problem may not be as severe as the patent troll issue, likely 
because of the other reasons directed at why a trademark troll 
problem may not exist.  
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